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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA~~culated: MAR
No. 72- 75

Recirculated : ______________

Georgia et al., Appellants, On Appeal from the United
States District Court for
v.
the Northern District of
United States.
Georgia.
[March -, 1973]
MR. J u sTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The Attorney General of the United States brought
this suit under § 12 (d) of the Voting Rights Act as
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973j (d), to enjoin the State of
Georgia from conducting elections for its House of Representatives under the 1972 legislative reapportionment
law. A three-judge federal court in the Northern District of Georgia agreed that certain aspects of the reapportionment law came within the ambit of § 5 of the Act,
42 U. S. C. § 1973c, and that the State, which is subject to the provisions of§ 5,1 had not obtained prior clearance from either the Attorney General or the District
Court for the District of Columbia. Accordingly, and
without reaching the question whether the reapportionment plan had the purpose or effect of "denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,"
1

211973

A State is subj ect to § 5 if it qualifie · under § 4 (b) , 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973b (b) . Covered State;; arc those whi ch on November 1, 1964,
employed any of several enumerated tests or devices as a prerequisite
to voting, and in which less than 50% of eligibl e vo trrs were
registered to vote or actually voted in the November 1964 presidential election . States that meet identical crit eria wi th reRpect to
the 1968 presidrntial election are also covered under the amend ed
Act. H is stipulated that Georgia is coYered under § 4 (b).

'

.

72- 75-0PINION
2

GEORGIA v. UNITED STATES

42 U. S. C. § 1973c, the District Court issued the requested injunction." The State brought this appeal. We
noted probable jurisdiction, staying enforcement of the
District Court judgment pending disposition of the appeal. 409 U. S. 911.
Following the 1970 Census, the Georgia Legislature set
out to reapportion its State House of Representatives,
State Senate, and federal congressional electoral districts.
vVe are here concerned only with the reapportionment
plan for the State House of Representatives. 3 The result
of the Legislature's deliberations was a plan (hereinafter
the 1971 plan) that, as compared with the prior 1968
scheme, decreased the number of districts from 118 to
105, and increased the number of multi-member districts
from 47 to 49. Whereas the prior apportionment plan
had generally preserved county lines, the 1971 plan did
not: 31 of the 49 multi-member districts and 21 of the
56 single-member districts irregularly crossed county
boundaries. The boundaries of nearly all districts were
changed, and in many instances the number of representatives per district was altered. Residents of some 31
counties formerly in single-member districts were brought
into multi-member districts. Under continuing Georgia
law, a candidate receiving less than a majority of the
votes cast for a position was required to participate in
a majority runoff election. Ga. Code § 34-1513. And in
the multi-member districts, each candidate was required
to designate the seat for which he was running, referred
to as the "numbered post." Ga. Code § 34-1015.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act forbids States subject to the Act from implementing any change in a "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting" without
" The decision of the District Court is umeported.
" No objection was interposed with respect to the State Senate or
fedeml congre8~ional districts.
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first obtaining a declaratory judgment from the District
Court for the District of Columbia that the proposed
change "does not have the purpose and will not have the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color," or submitting the plan to the
Attorney General of the United States and receiving no
objection within 60 clays. 42 U.S. C. § 1973c. Pursuant
to this requirement, the State of Georgia submitted the
1971 plan to the Attorney General on November 5, 1971.
T"'o weeks later, a representative of the Department of
Justice wrote to the State Attorney General, requesting
further informatiou needed to assess the racial impact
of the tendered plan:' This information was received on
January 6, 1972, and on March 3, 1972, the Attorney
General of the United States formally objected to the
State's plan. The objection letter cited the combination
of multi-member districts, numbered posts, majority runoff elections, and the extensive departure from the State's
prior policy of adhering to county lines. On the basis
of these changes plus particular changes in the structure
of potential black majority single-member districts, the
Attorney General was "unable to conclude that the plan
does not have a discriminatory racial effect on voting."
The letter stated that the Attorney General therefore felt
obligated to "interpose an objection to changes submitted
by the reapportionment plans."
The State Legislature immediatdy enacted a new reapportionment plan and repealed its predecessor. The
1972 plan increased the number of districts from 105 to
128, and decreased the number of multi-member districts
• The Justice Department asked for census maps of the 1964 and
196, House districts; the distribution of white and nonwhite population within the 1964, 1968, nnd 1971 districts; a hi::;tor~· of the primnry and gcneml elections in which Negro ca11didatrs ran; data,
in(·luding race, with respect to nil elected ~:>tate reprcsentati\·es; and
the legislatil'e history of all redistricting bills.
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from 49 to 32. Twenty-two of the multi-member districts
and 37 of the single-member districts still crossed county
boundaries.
This 1972 plan \vas submitted to the Attorney General
on March 15, and he objected on March 24. The Assistant Attorney General's letter stated, in part:
"After a careful analysis of the Act redistricting
the Georgia House of Representatives, I must conclude that this reapportionment does not satisfactorily remove the features found objectionable in
your prior submission, namely, the combination of
multi-member districts, numbered posts, and a majority (runoff) requirement discussed in my March 3,
1972 letter to you interposing an objection to your
earlier Section 5 submission. Accordingly, and for
the reasons enunciated in my March 3, 1972 letter
I must, on behalf of the Attorney General, object to
S. B. 690 reapportioning the Georgia House of
Representatives.''
When the Georgia Legislature resolved that it would
take no further steps to enact a new plan, the Attorney
General brought the present lawsuit.
The State of Georgia claims that § 5 is inapplicable
to the 1972 House plan, both because the Act does not
reach "reapportionment" and because the 1972 plan does
not constitute a change from procedures "in force or effect
on November 1, 1964." If applicable, the Act is claimed
to be unconstitutional as applied. The State also challenges two aspects of the Attorney General's conduct of
the § 5 objection procedure, claiming first that the Attorney General cannot object to a state plan without finding that it in fact has a discriminatory purpose or effect,
and second that the Attorney General's objection to the
1971 plan was not made within the 60-day time period
allowed for objection under the Act.
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Despite the fact that multi-member districts, numbered
posts, and a majority runoff requirement were features
of Georgia election law prior to November 1, 1964, the
changes that followed from the 1972 reapportionment are
plainly sufficient to invoke § 5 if that section of the Act
reaches the substance of those changes. Section 5 is not
concerned with a simple inventory of voting procedures,
but rather with the reality of changed practices as they
affect Negro voters. It seems clear that the extensive
reorganization of voting districts and the creation of
multi-member districts in place of single-member districts
in certain areas amounted to substantial departures from
the electoral state of things under previous law. The
real question is whether the substance of these changes
undertaken as part of the state reapportionment are
"standards, practices, or procedures with respect to voting" within the meaning of § 5.
The prior decisions of this Court compel the conclusion
that changes of the sort included in Georgia's 1972 House
reapportionment plan are cognizable under § .5. In South
Carolina Y. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, we upheld the
basic constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act. Mr.
Justice Black dissented from that judgment, precisely
describing the broad sweep of § 5:
"Section 5 goes on to provide that a State covered
by § 4 (b) can in no way amend its constitution or
lavvs relating to voting without first trying to persuade the Attorney General of the United States or
the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia that the new proposed laws do not have the
purpose and will not have the effect of denying the
right to vote to citizens on account of their race or
color." 383 U.S., at 356 (concurring and dissenting
opinion).

'

.
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The applicability of § 5 to election la"· changes such
as those enacted by Georgia in its 1972 plan was all but
conclusively established by the opinion of this Court in
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544. The
Allen opinion, dealing with four companion cases, held
that § 5 applied to a broad range of voting law changes,
and was constitutional as applied. With respect to the
reach of§ 5, we held that "[t]he legislative history on the
whole supports the view that Congress intended to reach
any state enactment which altered the election law of
a covered State in even a minor way." !d., at 566.
One of the companion cases, Fairley v. Patterson, involved a claim that a change from district to at-large
voting for county supervisor was a change in a "standard, practice or procedure with respect to voting." The
challenged procedure was held to be covered by § 5.
We noted that " [ t] he right to vote can be affected by a
dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 555 (1964)." In holding that § 5 reached voting law changes that threatened to dilute Negro voting
power, and in citing Reynolds v. Sims, we implicitly
recognized the applicability of § 5 to similar but more
s'veeping election law changes arising from the reapportionment of state legislatures. 393 U. S., at 565-566,
583-586 (concurring and dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.).
Had Congress disagreed with the interpretation of § 5
in Allen, it had ample opportunity to amend the statute.
After extensive deliberations in 1970 on bills to extend
the Voting Rights Act, during which the Allen case wa.s
repeatedly discussed," the Act was extended for five years,
"See, e. g., Hearings before Subcommittee No. 5 of thr House
Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 4249, H. R. 553R, and Similar
Proposals, 91st Cong., bt Sr,~., at 1, 4, 1R, 83, 130-131, 13::l, 147149, 154--155, 182-184, 402-454; Hearings before the Subcommittee
on ConRtitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
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without any substantive modification of § 5. Pub. L.
91-285, 85 Stat. 314, 315 (1970). We can only conclude,
then, that Allen correctly interpreted the congressional
design when it held that "the Act gives a broad interpretation to the right to vote, recognizing that voting includes 'all action necessary to make a vote effective.' "
393 U. S., at 565-566.
Another measure of the decisiveness with ·which Allen
controls the present case is the actual practice of covered
States since the Allen case was decided. Georgia, for example, submitted its 1971 plan to the Attorney General
because it clearly believed that plan was covered by § 5.
Its submission was "made pursuant to § 5," and the State
Attorney General explained in his submission that the
1968 reapportionment of the Georgia House of Representatives "was not submitted because at that time, prior
to Allen v. Board of Elections, ... it was believed to be
unnecessary to submit reapportionment plans to the
United States Attorney General pursuant to the Voting
Rights Act of 1965." When the Attorney General objected, Georgia changed its House plan and resubmitted
it pursuant to § 5. Other States covered by the Act
have also read Allen as controlling. The brief for the
United States advises us that as of December 1, 1972,
381 post-Allen reapportionment plans had been presented
to the Attorney General by various States for § 5 approval.
In the present posture of this case, the question is not
whether the redistricting of the Georgia House, including extensive shifts from single- to multi-member districts,
on Bills to Amend the Voting Rights Act, 9h;t Cong., 1~t ::md 2d
Scss., at 48, 195-196, 369-370, 397-398, 426-427, 469. David L.
Norman, then Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, testified that, "from court decision~, all these redistricting
plans are going to have to be submitted to the Attorney General for
his approval because they arc voting changes." Senate Hearings,
supra, at 507.
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in fact had a racially discriminatory purpose or effect.
The question, rather, is whether such changes have the
potential for diluting the value of the Negro vote and
are within the definitional terms of ~ 5. It is beyond
doubt that such a potential exists, cf. Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 U. S. 124, 141-144. In view of the teaching of
A llen,V reaffirmed in Perkins v. Mat thews, 400 U. S.
The appellnnt points to lanf(un~c in the Allen opinion that, it
left open the question of the npplir~1bility of § 5 to a state
rcnpportionmcnt law. The eited pa~sa~?;e in Allc11 is a~ follows:
"Appellees in No. 25 [Fairley v. Pattersonl also ar~ue that
§ 5 wns not intended to nppl~, to 11 rhnngc from district to nt-br~?;c
votin~. because :1pplirntion of § 5 would rnu~e a conflict in the
ndmin istrn tion of rrnpportionmcnt le~?;isln t ion. The~, ront end that
under surh a bro:1d reading of § .5. enforcrmcnt of a reapportionment
plan could be enjoined for failme to meet the § 5 approvnl requirements, 0\'Cn though the pbn h:1cl been :tppmvrd by u fcdcr:ll romt.
Appellees mge thnt Conf(rcs~ eould not have intended to force the
States to submit n renpportionmrnt plan to two different romts.
"We must reject a narrow construction thnt nppellees would ~ive
to § 5 . . . . The argument that some ndministrnti1·e problrm
might arise in the futmc doc~ not cstnblish thnt Congress intended
that § 5 lun·e :1 nn rrow !'<'ope; we Ira w to nnot her ruse n eonsidcration of :1ny possible conflict." 393 U.S .. at 56-t-565, 569.
The caveat implicit in this lnn~ungr would support the nppcllnnt's
position only if practical problems of :1dministration had emerged
in the period that has elapsed since Allen wns decided. This docs
not uppcnr to ht11·e been the rnsc. The brief of the Unit<.'d Stntcs
advises us that the Department of Justice ha~ adopted prorcduiw;
dcsi~nccl to minimize any conflicts between § 5 administrnti1·c rc1·icw
nnd federal conrt litigation based on Fourternth or Fifteenth Amendment. attacks npon state reapportionment pl:tns. 'Where n renpport ionment plan hns been prrsrribcd b~· federal .indicia! decree.
the Attorne~· General does not rcvic\\· it. Sec Conner v. Johnson,
402 U. 8. 690, 691. Where a plan has been submitted lo the Attorney Gencrnl and is at the same time being litigated with respect to
a Fifteenth Amendment claim, the Attorney General has deferred
to the judicial determination regarding racial discrimination. Finally,
the number of instances presenting an administrative-jndicinl overlap
ha · been small. Of the 381 reapportionments submitted to the At0

s:l~'R,

0

0
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379, we hold that the District Court was correct in deciding that the changes enacted in the 1972 reapportionment plan for the Georgia House of Representatives were
within the ambit of ~ 5 of the Voting Rights Act. And
for the reasons stated at length in South Carolina v.
Kat.zenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308-337, we reaffirm that the
Act is a permissible exercise of congressional power under
§ 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.
II

By way of implelllenting the performance of his obligation to pass on state submissions under ~ 5, the Attorney
General has promulgated and published in the Federal
Register certain administrative regulations, 28 CFR §51.
The appellant claims these regulations are without legislative authorization, and objects in particular to the
application in the present case of two regulations which
set forth the standards for decision on submissions and
more fully define the 60-day time period provided in the
Act.
It is true, as the appellant contends, that§ 5 itself does
not authorize the Attorney General to promulgate any
regulations. But ~ 5 is also silent as to the procedures the
Attorney General is to employ in deciding whether or
not to object to state submissions, as to the standards
governing the contents of those submissions, and as to
the meaning of the 60-day time period in which the Attorney General is to object, if at all. Rather than reading the statute to grant him unfettered discretion as to
procedures, standards, and administration in this sensitive
area, the Attorney General has chosen instead to formulate and publish objective ground rules. If these regulations are reasonable and do not conflict with the Voting
Rights Act itself, then 5 U. S. C. § 301, which gives to
torney Geneml, only 19 of the objected-to submissions were involved
in litigation when submitted.

0

•
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"[tlhe head of an Executive department" the power to
"prescribe regulations for the government of his department, .. . [and] the distribution and performance of
its business ... ," is surely ample legislative authority
for the regulations. See United States Y. Morehead, 243
U. S. 607, Smith v. United States, 170 U.S. 372.
In 28 CFR § 51.19, the Attorney General has set forth
the standards to be employed in deciding whether or not
to object to a state submission. The regulation states
that the burden of proof is on the submitting party, and
that the Attorney General will refrain from objecting
only if his review of the material submitted satisfies him
that the proposed change does not have a racially discriminatory purpose or effect. If he is persuaded to
the contrary, or if he cannot within the 60-day time
period satisfy himself that the change is without a discriminatory purpose or effect, the regulation states that
tho Attorney General will object to the submission. 7 In
objecting to the 1971 plan, tho Assistant Attorney General wrote that he was "unable to conclude that the plan
does not have a discriminatory racial effect on voting."
The objection letter to the 1972 plan did not specify a
28 CFR § 51.19, in pertinent part, stat es that : " . . . the burden of proof on the submitting authority is the same in submitting
changes to the Attorney General as it would be in submitting changes
to the Distri ct Cout'l for the Distri ct of Columbin. . . . If the
Attorney General is sa ti~fied that the submitted change does not
have a racially discriminatory purpose or effect , he will not obj ect
to the change and will so notify the submitting authorit y. If the
Attorney General determines that the submit ted cha nge has a racially
di ~:; crimi na tory purpose or effect, he will enter an objection and will
so notify the submitting authority. If the evidence as to the purpose or effect of the change is conflicting , and the Attomey General
is unable to resolYe the conflict within the 60-day period, he shall,
consistent with t he above-described burden of proof applicabl e in
the District Court, enter an objection and so notify the submitting
authorit y. "
7

0

•
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degree of certainty as to the plan's discriminatory impact,.
but instead stated that the new plan had not remedied
the features found objectionable in its predecessor.
Although both objections were consistent with the
Attorney General's regulations, the appellant in effect
attacks the legitimacy of the regulation described above
in contending that the Attorney General is without
power to object unless he has actually found that the
changes contained in a submission have a discriminatory
purpose or effect.
In assessing this claim, it is important to focus on the
entire scheme of § 5. That portion of the Voting Rights
Act essentially freezes the election laws of the covered
States unless a declaratory judgment is obtained in the
District Court for the District of Columbia holding that
a proposed change is without discriminatory purpose or
effect. The alternative procedure of submission to the
Attorney General "merely gives the covered State a rapid
method of rendering a new state election law enforceable."
Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra, at 549.
It is well established that in a declaratory judgment
action under § 5, the plaintiff State has the burden of
proo£. 8 What the Attorney General's regulations do is
to place the same burden on the submitting party in a
§ 5 objection procedure. Though the choice of language
in the objection letter sent to the State of Georgia was
not a model of precision, in the context of the promulgated regulations the letter surely notified the State with
sufficient clarity that it had not sustained its burden of
8 The very effect of § 5 was to shift the burden of proof with
respect to racial discrimination in voting. Rather than requiring
affected parties to bring suit to challenge every changed voting
practice, Statrs subject to § 5 were required to obtain prior clearance before proposed changes could be put into effect. The burden
of proof is on "the areas seeking relief." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 335.
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proving that the proposed changes were free of a racially
discriminatory effect. It is not necessary to hold that
this allocation of the burden of proof by the Attorney
General was his only possible choice under the Act, in
order to find it a reasonable means of administering his
§ 5 obligation. Any less stringent standard might well
have rendered the formal declaratory j uclgment procedure
a dead letter by making available to covered States a far
smoother path to clearance. The Attorney General's
choice of a proof standard was thus at least reasonable
and consistent \vith the Act, and we hold that his objection pursuant to that sta11dard was lawful and effective.
The appellant's final contention is that the Attorney
General's objection to the 1971 plan was untimely, and
so the submitted plan should have been held by the
District Court to have gone into effect. It is far from
clear that this claim is not simply moot, since the state
enactment establishing the 1972 plan explicitly repealed
the 1971 plan, 0 and the objection to the 1972 plan was
clearly within the statutory time period. In any event,
the claim is without merit.
In promulgating regulations, the Attorney General
dealt with several aspects of the 60-day time limit established by § 5 of the Act. The regulations provide that
all calendar days count as pa.rt of the allotted period. that
parties whose submissions are objected to may seek
reconsideration on the basis of new information and obtain a ruling within 60 days of that request, and that
the 60-day period shall commence from the time the Department of Justice receives a submission satisfying the
enumerated requirements. 28 CFR § 51.3 (c), (d), (b).
In the present case, the Attorney General found the
initial submission of the 1971 plan incomplete under the
regulations. Two weeks after receiving it, he requested
0

Sec Ga. Srnate Bill 690, March 9, 1972.
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additional information.' 0 His letter referred to 28 CFR
~ 51.18, a regulation providing for a request for additional
information, and noted the additional regulatory provision that the 60-day period would not commence until
the information was received. The State did not submit
the requested data until January 6, 1972. Under the
above mentioned regulation the 60-day period commenced on that date, and the Department of Justice
made its objection within 60 days- on March 3.
The appellant argues that the Attorney General has
granted himself more time than the statute provided by
promulgating regulations suspending the time period
until a complete submission is received. Here again, the
question is whether the regulation is a reasonable administrative effectuation of § 5 of the Act. The judgment that the Attorney General must make is a difficult
10
The lett er sent to the AttornC)' Gen<'ral of G0orgia stat0d that
a " prdiminar)' examination " of the matl'rials submitted l0d the
Dcpa rlmrnt of .Tustire to conclude '·that the dnta s0nt to the
Attorney General a rc in ~ uffi c i e nt to evnlunt<' prop<'rly the changes
.vou ha ,·c submitted. In accordnncr with Sections 51.10 (a) (6) a nd
.'H.lS (n) of th<' Proc e dure~ for the Administration of Scrtion 5 of the
Yoting Ri~ht ~ Act of 1965 ... would you pkn ~c assist us by providing t his Department tho following ndditional information . . . . "
The promulgnt<'d rcgulntions defin<' in 28 CFR § 51.10 tho content s of a ~ ubmi ss ion. § 51.10 (a) (6) states :
" With rCS})ect to redistricting, nnncxation, nnd other complex
changes, other information which the Attorney General determine:;
is requir<'cl to enable him to evaluate 1he purpoRo or effect of the
change. Su ch otlwr informntion may include items listed under
paragraph (b) of this section. When such other information is
required, the Attornry Geneml shall notify the submitting authority
in the manner provided in § 51.18 (a )."
Section 51.10 (b) " strongly urges " submitting authorities to produce
the information enumerated to tho extent it is a vnilablc nnd relevant
to the submitted changes. Virtunlly all of the information requested
in this case, sec n. 4, supm, falls wi thin the cnum0rated catcgori<'s of
§ 51.10 (b).
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and complex one, and no one would argue that it should
be made without adequate information. There is no
serious claim in this case that the additional informa.tion requested was unnecessary or irrelevant to § 5 evaluation of the submitted reapportionment plan. 11 Yet if
the Attorney General were denied the power to suspend
the 60-day period until a complete submission were tendered, his only plausible response to an inadequate or
incomplete submission would be simply to object to it.
He would then leave it to the State to submit adequate
information if it wished to take advantage of this means
of clearance under § 5. This result would only add
acrimony to the administration of § 5. We conclude,
therefore, that this facet of the Attorney General's regulations is wholly reasonable and consistent with the
Act. 1 2
III
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed. Since, however, elections were
conducted under the disputed 1972 plan by reason of this
Court's stay order, it would be inequitable to require new
elections at this time.
Sec n. 4, supra.
The appellant contends that to allow the Attorney General to
promulga te thi ~ regulation is t o open the way to fri\·olous and repeated delays by the Justice Department of laws of vital concern to
the coYcred States. No such conduct by the Attornr~· General is
presented here, and by U]Jholding thr basic ntlidity of the regulation we most ass ured!~· do not prejudge any ease in which such
unwarrant ed a dmini ~ tra ti ve conduct may be shown. Furthermore,
a submission to the Attornry Genernl is not the excluHive mode of
preclearance under § 5. If a State finds the Attorney General's
drlays unreasonable, or if he objects to the submi s~ i on , the State
"m:ty still enforce the legislation upon securing :~ deelam tory judgmen t in the District Court for the District of Columbia." Allen v.
State Board of Elections, 393 U . S. 544, 549.
11

1

~
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The case is remanded to the District Court with in-·
structions that any future elections under the Georgia
House reapportionment plan be enjoined unless and until
the State pursuant to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, tenders to the Attorney General a plan to which he does not
object, or obtains a favorable declaratory judgment from
the District Court for the District of Columbia.

It is so ordered_
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MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opmwn of the
Court.
The Attorney General of the United States brought
this suit under § 12 (d) of the Voting Rights Act as
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973j (d), to enjoin the State of
Georgia from conducting elections for its House of Representatives under the 1972 legislative reapportionment
law. A three-judge federal court in the Northern District of Georgia agreed that certain aspects of the reapportionment law came \Yithin the ambit of § 5 of the Act,
42 U. S. C. § 1973c, and that the State, which is subject to the provisions of § 5/ had not obtained prior clearance from either the Attorney General or the District
Court for the District of Columbia. Accordingly, and
without reaching the question whether the reapportionment plan had the purpose or effect of "denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,"
A State is subj ect to § 5 if it qua lifies under § 4 (b), 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973b (b). Covered States arc those which on November 1, 1964,
employed any of several enumerated tc~ts or deYices as a prerequisite
to voting, and in which J c~s than 50 % of eligible voters were
registered to vote or actually voted in the November 1964 pre~i
dential election. States that meet identical criteria with respect to
the 1968 presidential election are also covered under the amended
Act. It is stipulated that Georgia is co>·ered under § 4 (b) .
1
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42 U. S. C. § Hl73c, the District Court issued the requested injunction." The State brought this appeal. We
noted probable .i urisdiction, staying enforcement of the
District Court j uclgmen t pending disposition of the appeal. 409 U. S. 911.
Following the 1970 Census, the Georgia Legislature set
out to reapportion its State House of Representatives,
State Senate, and federal congressional electoral districts.
\Ve are here concerned only with the reapportionment
plan for the State House of Representatives." The result
of the Legislature's deliberations was a plan (hereinafter
the 1971 plan) that, as compared with the prior 1968
scheme, decreased the number of districts from 118 to
105, and increased the number of multi-member districts
from 47 to 49. Whereas the prior apportionment plan
had generally preserved county lines, the 1971 plan did
not: 31 of the 49 multi-member districts and 21 of the
56 single-member districts irregularly crossed county
boundaries. The boundaries of nearly all districts were
changed, and in many instances the number of representatives per district was altered. Residents of some 31
counties formerly in single-member districts were brought
into multi-member districts. Under continuing Georgia
law, a candidate receiving less than a majority of the
votes cast for a position was required to participate in
a majority runoff election. Ga. Code§ 34-1513. And in
the multi-member districts, each candidate was required
to designate the seat for which he was running. referred
to as the "numbered post." Ga. Code § 34-1015.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act forbids States subject to the Act from implementing any change in a "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice. or procedure with respect to voting" without
" The deciciion of the District Court is umeported.
" No objection was interposed with respect to the State Senate or
fc•deral congrC'i'sional districts.
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first. obtaining a declaratory judgment from the District
Court for the District of Columbia that the proposed
change "does not have the purpose and will not have the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color," or submitting the plan to the
Attorney General of the United States and receiving no
objection within 60 days. 42 U.S. C.§ 1973c. Pursuant
to this requirement, the State of Georgia submitted the
1971 plan to the Attorney General on November 5, 1971.
Two weeks later, a representative of the Department of
Justice wrote to the State Attorney General, requesting
further information needed to assess the racial impact
of the tendered plan:' This information was received on
January 6, 1972, and on March 3, 1972, the Attorney
General of the United States formally objected to the
State's plan. The objection letter cited the combination
of multi-member districts. numbered posts, m.ajority runoff elections, and the extensive departure from the State's
pr·ior policy of adhering to county lines. On the basis
of these changes plus particular changes in the structure
of potential black majority single-member districts, the
Attorney General \\'aS "unable to conclude that the plan
does not have a discriminatory racial effect on voting."
The letter stated that the Attorney General therefore felt
obligated to "interpose an objection to changes submitted
by the reapportionment plans."
The State Legislature immediately enacted a new reapportionment plan and repealed its predecessor. The
1972 plan increased the number of districts from 105 to
128, and decreased the number of multi-member districts
'1 The Ju ~ ticc Drp[lrtmcnt [(~ked for rCIJ. 'Us map:-; of the 1964 and
196H Hou ~e di:-;trictR ; thr di ~ tribut ion of white and nonwhite population within the 196-t, 1958, and 1971 di ~ tri<'ts; :1 hi~t or.1· of the primary and general rlections in which 1\'r~ro r[lndidatr:; ran ; data,
including rare, with rc:;pcct to all elected ~~ [l(C n·prcscnt nt i1· c~; and
the legi~lnti1 ·e hi ~ tory of all redi~trirting bill><.
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from 49 to 32. T"·enty-two of the multi-member districts
and 37 of the single-member districts still crossed county
boundaries.
This 1972 plan was submitted to the Attorney General
on March 15, and he objected on March 24. The Assistant Attorney General's letter stated, in part:
"After a careful analysis of the Act redistricting
the Georgia House of Representatives, I must conclude that this reapportionment does not satisfactorily remove the features found objectionable in
your prior submission, namely, the combination of
multi-member districts, numbered posts, and a majority (runoff) requirement discussed in my March 3,
1972 letter to you interposing an objection to your
earlier Section 5 submission. Accordingly, and for
the reasons enunciated in my March 3, 1972 letter
I must, on behalf of the Attorney General, object to
S. B. 690 reapportioning the Georgia House of
Representatives."
When the Georgia Legislature resolved that it would
take no further steps to enact a new plan, the Attorney
General brought the present lawsuit.
The State of Georgia claims that § 5 is inapplicable
to the 1972 House plan, both because the Act does not
reach "reapportionment" and because the 1972 plan does
not constitute a change from procedures "in force or effect
on November 1, 1964." If applicable, the Act is claimed
to be unconstitutional as applied. The State also challenges two aspects of the Attorney General's conduct of
the § 5 objection procedure, claiming first that the Attorney General cannot object to a state plan without finding that it in fact has a discriminatory purpose or effect,
and second that the Attorney General's objection to the
1971 plan was not made within the 60-day time period
allowed for objection under the Act.
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Despite the fact that multi-member districts, numbered
posts, and a majority runoff requirement were features
of Georgia election law prior to November 1, 1964, the·
cha11ges that follo\Yed from the 1972 reapportionment are
plainly sufficient to invoke § 5 if that section of the Act
reaches the substance of those changes. Section 5 is not
concerned with a simple inventory of voting procedures,
but rather with the reality of changed practices as they
affect Negro voters. It seems clear that the extensive
reorganization of voting districts and the creation of
multi-member districts in place of single-member districts
in certain areas amounted to substantial departures from
the electoral state of things under previous law. The
real question is whether the substance of these changes
undertaken as part of the state reapportionment are
"standards, practices, or procedures with respect to voting" within the meaning of § 5.
The prior decisions of this Court compel the conclusion
that changes of the sort included in Georgia's 1972 House
reapportionment plan are cognizable under § 5. In South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, we upheld the
basic constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act. Mr.
Justice Black dissented from that judgment, precisely
describing the broad sweep of § 5:
"Section 5 goes on to provide that a State covered
by § 4 (b) can in no way amend its constitution or
laws relating to voting without first trying to persuade the Attorney General of the United States or
the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia that the new proposed la\\'s do not have the
purpose and will not have the effect of denying the
right to vote to citizens on account of their race or
color." 383 U. S., at 356 (concurring and dissenting
opinion).
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The applicability of § 5 to election law changes such
as those enacted by Georgia in its 1972 plan was all but
conclusively established by the opinion of this Court in
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544. The
Allen opinion, dealing with four companion cases, held
that § 5 applied to a broad range of voting law changes,
and was constitutional as applied. With respect to the
reach of§ 5, we held that "[t]he legislative history on the
whole supports the view that Congress intended to reach
any state enactment which altered the election law of
a cover-ed State in even a minor way." I d., at 566.
One of the companion cases, Fairley v. Patterson, involved a claim that a change from district to at-large
voting for county supervisor was a change in a "standard, practice or procedure with respect to voting." The
challenged procedure was held to be covered by § 5.
We noted that "[t]hc right to vote can be affected by a
dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot. Sec Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 555 (1964)." ln holding that§ 5 reached voting law changes that threatened to dilute Negro voting
po\\'er, and in citing Reynolds v. Sirns, we implicitly
recognized the applicability of § 5 to similar but more
sweE'ping p]ection la\Y changes arising from the reapportionment of state legislatures. 393 U. S., at. 565-.566,
583-586 (concurring and dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.).
Had Congress disagreed with the interpretation of § 5
in Allen, it had ample opportunity to amend the statute.
After extensive deliberations in 1970 on bills to extend
the Voting Rights Act, during which the Allen case was
repeatedly discussed," the Act was extended for five years,
;; See, e. {! .. Hearings before Subcmmnittee No. 5 of the IIou~c
Committre on the Judiciary on H. R. 4249, H. R. 5538, and Similar
Propo~nb, 9bt Cong., 1st Sess., ni 1, 4, 18, 83, 130-131, 133, 14714!), 154-15.5, 182-184, 402-454; Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Con~titutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
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without any substantive modificatio11 of § 5. Pub. L.
91-285, 85 Stat. 314, 315 (1970). We can only conclude,
then, that cillen correctly interpreted tho congressional
design when it held that "tho Act gives a broad interpretation to tho right to vote, recogni:dng that voting includes 'all action necessary to make a vote effective.' >r
39:3 U. S., at 565-566.
Another measure of the decisiveness with which Allen
controls tho present case is the actual practice of covered
States since the Allen case was decided. Georgia, for example, submitted its 1971 plan to the Attorney General
because it clearly believed that plan "·as covered by § 5.
Jts submission \vas "made pursuant to § 5," and the State
Attorney General explained in his submission that tho
1968 reapportionment of tho Georgia House of Representatives "was not ~::ubmitted because at that time, prior
to Allen v. Board of Elections, ... it \vas believed to be
unnecessary to submit reapportionment plans to the
United States Attorney General pursuant to the Voting
Rights Act of 1965." When the Attorney General objected, Georgia changed its House plan and resubmitted
it pursuant to § 5. Other States covered by the Act
have also road Allen as controlling. Tho brief for tho
United States advises us that as of December 1, 1972,
381 post-Allen reapportionment plans had been presented
to tho Attorney General by various States for§ 5 approval.
In tho present posture of this case, tho question is not
whether the redistricting of the Georgia House, including extensive shifts from single- to multi-member districts,.
on Hills lo Amend the Voting Hight:> Act, 91~t Cong., bt and 2d
Sc~:;., at 48, 195-196, 369-370, 397-391\, 426-427, 46!l DaYid 1.
Norman, then Deputy Assi::>tant Attornry General. Cid Hight,; Di,·ision, tc~tifiPd that, "from court decil"ion~, all t hr:<r rrdist ricting
plans nrr going to ha1·e to be submittrd to thr Attornr.1· Grnrral for
hi!> npprontl bccau~c thry arc voting ch:tllgr~." Srnat c Hearings,.
supm, at 507.
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in fact had a racially discriminatory purpose or effect.
The question, rather, is whether such changes have the
potential for diluting the value of the Negro vote and
are within the definitional terms of § 5. It is beyond
doubt that such a potential exists, cf. Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 U. S. 124, 141-144. In view of the teaching of
Allen, 6 reaffirmed in Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S.
6

The appellnnt points to language in the Allen opinion that, it
left oprn thr qur;;tion of the applicability of § 5 to :1 state
rrapportionmrnt law. Thr cited passage in Allen is a~ follow;;:
"Apprllrrs in No. 25 rFairley v. Patterson] also nrgur that
§ 5 was not intended to apply to a changr from diHtric1 to nt-brge
Yoting, bE'causr application of § 5 would cau~e a conflict in the
ndmini~tration of rrapportionmE'nt legi:;lation. Thr~· contrnd that
under such a broad reading of § 5, enforcemrnt of a reaPJ)Ortionmrnt
plan could be rnjoined for failure to meet the § 5 approntl requiremen Is, even though the plnn lwei been approved by a federnl court.
Appellees urge that Congress could not havr intended to force the
Stales to submit a rrapportionment plan to two different courts.
"Wr must reject a narrow construction that appellees would give
to § 5 . . . . The argument that some administrative problem
might arisr in the futme does not estn bli~h that Congress in I rnded
I hat§ 5 have a narrow scope; we leave to another casr n consideration of nny possible conflict." 393 U. S., at 564-565, 569.
The caveat implicit in this language would support thr appellant's
position only if practical problems of adminjstration had rmerged
in thr period that has cl:1psed since Allen was decided. This does
not appear to have bern the case. The brief of the Unitrd States
advises us that the Departmrnt of Justice has adopted procrdures
drsignrd to minimize any conflicts between § 5 administr::ttiYe reYirw
::tnd fedrral court litigation based on Fourternth or Fiftrenth Amendmrnt attacks upon state reapportionment plans. Wherr a reapportionment plan has been prescribed by federal judicinl decree,
thr Attorney General does not rrview it. Ser Conner v. Johnson,
402 U. S. 690, 691. Whrre a plan has been submitted to the Attorney General and is at the same time being litigated with resprct to
a Fifteenth Amendment claim, the Attorney General hns drfrrrcd
to the judicial detrrmination regarding racial di~crimination. Finally,
the number of in~tnnce~ presrnting an administratiw-judicial overlap
has been small. Of the 381 reapportionments submitted to the At-

sn~·s,
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379, we hold that the District Court \YaS correct in deciding that the changes enacted in the 1972 reapportionment plan for the Georgia House of Representatives were
within the ambit of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act.' And
for the reasons stated at length in South Caroli11a Y.
Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 308-337, we reaffirm that the·
Act is a permissible exercise of congressional power under·
§ 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.
II

By way of implementing the performance of his obligation to pass on state submissions under § 5, the Attorney
General has promulgated and published in the Federal
Register certain administrative regulations, 28 CFR §51.
The appellant claims these regulations are without legislative authorization, and objects in particular to the
application in the present case of two regulations which
set forth the standards for decision on submissions and
more fully define the 60-day time period provided in the
Act.
It is true, as the appellant contends, that § 5 itself does
not authorize the Attorney General to promulgate any
regulations. But § 5 is also silent as to the procedures the
Attorney General is to employ in deciding whether or
not to object to state submissions, as to the standards
governing the contents of those submissions, and as to·
torney General, only 19 of the objected-to submissions were involYed
in litigation when submitted.
7
Georgia has argued that § 5 approval is needed only with respect
to those electoral districts in which a change in a ";;tnndard, practice,.
or procedure with respect to voting" occurred. In an appropriate
case a State might establish that a reapportionment plan left some
districts unaffected by even a minor change with the potential for
diluting the Yalue of the Negro vote. We do not decide whether
Georgia could show the existence of any unaffected di;;tricts in this
cat>e, and we leaye that issue for consideration by the District Comt
on remand.
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the meaning of the 60-day time period in ·which the Attorney General is to object, if at all. Rather than reading the statute to grant him unfettered discretion a.s to
procedures, f'tanclards, and administration in this sensitive
area, the Attorney General has chosen instead to formulate and publish objective ground rules. If these regulations arc reasonable and do not conflict with the Voting
Rights Act itself, then 5 U. S. C. ~ 301, which gives to
"[tlhe head of an Executive department" the power to
"prescribe regulations for the government of his department, . . . rand] the distribution and performance of
its business ... ," is surely ample legislative authority
for the regulations. Sec United States v. M oreltead, 243
U. S. 607, Smith v. United States, 170 U. S. 372.
In 28 CFR § 51.19, the Attorney General has set forth
the standards to be employed in deciding whether or not
to object to a state submission. The regulation states
that the burden of proof is on the submitting party, and
that the Attorney General will refrain from objecting
only if his review of the material submitted satisfies him
that the proposed change does not have a racially discriminatory purpose or effect. If he is persuaded to
the contrary. or if he cannot within the 60-day time
period satisfy himself that the change is without a discrilTtinatory purpose or effect, the regulation states that
the Attorney General will object to the submission. 8 In
R 28 CFR § 51.19, in pert incnt part, ~tate~ that: " . . . the burdrn of proof on thr ~uhmitting authority i~ the ~ame in , uhmitlii\g
change~ to t br Attorne.1· General ao; it would lw in ~ubmit ting changes
to the Di~trirt Court for the Di~trict of Columbia. . . . U the
Attorney General i~ sati~fied lh;lt the ~ubmittecl rhauge doc~ not
han a rariall~· discriminatory purpose or effect, he will not object
to the change ;mel will so notify the submitting authority. If the
Attome.1· Genrral determines that the submitted change has a racially
di~criminatory purpose or effect, he will enter an objection and will
so 11otify the submitting authority. If the evidence as to the purpose or effect of the change is conflicting, and the Attorney General
is unable to reso!l·e the conflict within the 60-day period, he shall,
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objecting to the 1071 plan. the Assistant Attorney General \\'rote that he was "unable to conclude that the plan
does not have a discriminatory racial effect on voting."
The objection letter to the 1072 plan did not specify a
degree of certainty as to the plan's discriminatory impact,
but instead stated that the new plan had not remedied
the features found objectionable in its predecessor.
Although both objections "·ere consistent with the
Attorney General's regulations, the appellant in effect
attacks the legitimacy of the regulation described above
in contending that the Attorney General is \Yithout
power to object unless he has actually found that the
changes contained in a submission have a discriminatory
purpose or effect.
In assessing this claim, it is important to focus on the
entire scheme of ~ 5. That portion of the Voting Rights
Act essentially freezes the election laws of the covered
States unless a declaratory judgment is obtained in the
District Court for the District of Columbia holding that
a proposed change is without discriminatory purpose or
effect. The alternative procedure of submission to the
Attorney General "merely gives the covered State a rapid
method of rendering a ne\\' state election law enforceable."
Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra, at 549.
It is well established that in a declaratory judgment
action under § 5. the plaintiff State has the burden of
proof.!) What the Attorney General's regulations do is
con1<i~tcnt with thr abo,·e-de~cribrcl burdrn of proof :1pplirable in
thr District Com!, rnter nn objection and ~o notif~· the ~ubmitting
authority."
0 The \'C'I')' effect of § 5 \Yas to shift t hP burdrn of proof with
rr~pcct to mrinl di1<crimination in voting. Rathrr than reCJuiring
affectrd parties to bring suit to rhallrngr e1w~· changrd 1·oting
practice, Stales subjec·t to § 5 wrrc rerptired to obtain prior clear:mre brforc propo:;C'd rhangrs could be put into cffrcl. The burdrn
of proof is on "the areas f'eeking relief." South Carolina Y. Katzen-

bach, 31\3 U. S. 301, 335.
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to place the same burden on the submitting party in a
~ 5 objection procedure. Though the choice of language
in the objection letter sent to the State of Georgia was
not a model of precision, in the context of the promulgated regulations the letter surely notified the State with
sufficient clarity that it had not sustained its burden of
proving that the proposed changes were free of a racially
discriminatory effect. It is not necessary to hold that
this allocation of the burden of proof by the Attorney
General was his only possible choice under the Act, in
order to find it a reasonable means of administering his
~ 5 obligation. Any less stringent standard might ·well
have rendered the formal declaratory judgment procedure
a dead letter by making available to covered States a far
smoother path to clearance. The Attorney General's
choice of a proof standard was thus at least reasonable
and consistent with the Act, and ·we hold that his objection pursuant to that standard was la,vful and effective.
The appellant's final contention is that the Attorney
General's objection to the 1971 plan was untimely, and
so the submitted plan should have been held by the
District Court to have gone into effect. It is far from
clear that this claim is not simply moot, since the state
enactment establishing the 1972 plan explicitly repealed
the 1971 plan/ 0 and the objection to the 1972 plan was
clearly within the statutory time period. In any event,
the claim is without merit.
In promulgating regulations, the Attorney General
dealt with several aspects of the 60-day time limit established by § 5 of the Act. The regulations provide that
all calendar days count as part of the allotted period, that
parties \vhose submissions are objected to may seek
reconsideration on the basis of new information and obtain a ruling within 60 days of that request, and that
10

See Ga. Senate Bill 690, March 9, 1972.

0

•
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the 60-day period shall commence from the time the Department of Justice receives a submission satisfying theenumerated requirements. 28 CFR § 51.3 (c), (d), (b).
In the present case, the Attorney General found the
initial submission of the 1971 plan incomplete under the
regulations. T\YO \veeks after receiving it, he requested
additional information. 11 His letter referred to 28 CFR
§ 51.18, a regulation providing for a request for additional
information, and noted the additional regulatory provision that the 60-clay period would not commence until
the information ·was received. The State did not submit
the requested data until January 6, 1972. Under the
above mentioned regulation the 60-day period commenced on that elate, and the Department of Justice
made its objection within 60 days-on March 3.
The appellant argues that the Attorney General has
granted himself more time than the statute provides by
The letter sent to the Attorne~' General of Georgia stated that
a "preliminary examination" of the materials submittrd !C'd the
Department of Justice to conclude "that the data sent to the
Attorne~· General arc insufficient to evaluate properly the changes
you have submitt<:>d. In accordance with Sections 51.10 (a) (6) and
51.18 (a) of the Procedures for the Admini~trntion of Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 ... would you please assist us b:> providing this Department the following additional information . . . . "
The promulgated regulations define in 28 CFR § 51.10 the contents of a submis::;ion. § 51.10 (a) (6) state~:
"With respect to redistricting, annexation, and other complex
changes, other information which the Attorney Cenrrnl det<:>rmincs
is required to enable him to evaluate the purpose or effect of the
change. Such other information may include it ems li~ted under
paragraph (b) of this section. When such other information is
required, the Attorney General ::;hall notify the submitting :mthority
iu the manner provided in § 51.18 (a)."
Section 51.10 (b) "strongly urge::;" submitting authoritic.; to produce
the information enumerated to tl1c extent it i::; :wailablc and relevant
to the submitted change;.;. Virtually all of the inform:tt ion requested
in this case, sec n. 4, supra, falls within the cnumcratrd categories of
§ 51.10 (b).
11
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promulgating regulations suspending the time period
until a complete submission is received. Here again, the
question is whether the regulation is a reasonable administrative effectuation of § 5 of the Act. The judgment that the Attorney General must make is a difficult
and complex one, and no one would argue that it should
be made ·without adequate information. There is no
serious claim in this case that the additional information requested was unnecessary or irrelevant to § 5 evaluation of the submitted reapportionment plan.' 2 Yet if
the Attorney General were denied the power to suspend
the 60-day period until a complete submission were tendered, his only plausible response to an inadequate or
incomplete submission "·ould be simply to object to it.
He would then leave it to the State to submit adequate
information if it wished to take advantage of this means
of clearance under § 5. This result would only add
acrimony to the administration of § 5. We conclude,
therefore, that this facet of the Attorney General's regulations is wholly reasonable and consistent "·ith the
Act.' 3
1

" Sec n. 4, supra.
'"The UJ1prll:mt contrndR thnt to allow the Attorne~· Grnrral to
promulgate thi~ regul:dion i~ to open thr way to fri1·olou~ nnd repeated dcla~·s b~· the .Tustiec Drpartment of laws of 1·ital concern to
tho coyered States. No such conduct by the Attornr~· Gcnrral is
pre~rnted here, and b~· upholding thr ba;.:ir Ynliclity of the rcgub1ion we most nssuredl~· do not prejudge an~· casr in whir·h such
unwarranted ndrnini~tral i\'c conduct ma.1· be shown. Furl hcrmore,
a submi":;ion to the Attornr~· Grnrral i~ not the exclu~iw mode of
preclearance under § 5. If a Stalr find~ the Attornry General's
dcln~·:; unreasonable, or if he objects to the submis:;ion, the State
"m:t.l' still enforce the legislation upon securing a declaratory judglll<'lll in the DiHtrict Court for the District of Columbia." Allen v.
State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 549.
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III
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed. Since, however, elections were
conducted under the disputed 1972 plan by reason of this
Court's stay order, it would be inequitable to require new
elections at this time.
The case is remanded to the District Court with instructions that any future elections under the Georgia
House reapportionment plan be enjoined unless and until
the State pursuant to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, tenders to the Attorney General a plan to which he does not
object, or obtains a favorable declaratory judgment from
the District Court for the District of Columbia.
It is so ordered.
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No. 72-75 GEORGIA v. UNITED STATES
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with MR.
I

l

JUSTICE WHITE that the Attorney General did not comply with
of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.s. C.

§

§

5

1973c, and that therefore

Georgia's reapportionment act should have been allowed to go into
effect. It is indeed a serious Intrusion, incompatible with the
basic structure of our system, for federal authorities to compel a
State to submit its legislation for advance review. As a minimum,
assuming the constitutionality of the Act, the Attorney General
should be required to comply with it explicitly and to invoke its
provisions only when he is able to make an affirmative finding
rather than an ambivalent one.
More fundamentally, I believe that the Court should reconsider

-

its decision 1n South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.s. 301 (1966), \
upholding the constitutt.nality of

§

5. As Mr. Justice Black stated

so forcefully in his dissent in that case, the power vested in federal
I
I
I

I
I

!

2.
officials to veto state laws in advance of their effectiveness
"distorts our constitutional structure of government. " 383 U. s. ,
1
at 358. Nothing in the Fifteenth Amendnent serves to overturn the

underlying premise of the federal system that the State legislative
process is an independent one. The results of that process are
of course subject to challenge in federal court and under federal
law, but the requirement of prior screening by federal officials,
executive or judicial, works a "revolutionary innovation in
American government" Allen v. Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544,
585 (196 ) (opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan), an innovation which
hobbles the state lawmaking process.
The constitutional infirmities of

§

5 have become ever

more clear as this Court has expanded its scope. Mr. Justice
Harlan had the better of the argument, it seems to me, when in
Allen he contended that by its language and legislative history
§

5 was directed only against ''those techniques that prevented

Negroes from voting at all". 393 U.S., at 585. The majority

3.
disagreed, and in Fairley v. Patterson, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), a
companion case to Allen, ruled

§

5 applicable to a change from

district to at-large election of county supervisors. Two years later,
Mat_lu~ws,

1n Perkinf! v.

400 U.S. 379 (1971),

§

5 was held to apply

to changes in the location of polling places, to municipal annexation
of adjacent areas, and to a change from ward to at-large election
2

of aldermen.
Whatever the merit in the position that Congress had
constitutional authority to order federal screening of such nonessential "devices" and poll taxes or literacy tests, federal
screening of the location of polling places, of reapportionment,
and particularly of annexation is markedly more intrusive. The
selection of polling places and the drawing of district boundaries
are necessary aspects of a democratic electoral system -a state
or political subdivision may move polling places for convenience
or technological necessity; it may redraw boundaries to reflect
shifts in population; and a municipality may annex outlying lands

4.
in order to secure the tax base necessary to cope with urban

problems. Unlike the adoption of a poll tax or a literacy test,
each of these changes is commonplace and some are unavoidable,
both in the Stabls and subdivisions covered by the Act and in those
3

not covered.
Because subsequent development vindicate the wisdom of
Mr. Justice Black's view in Katzenbach 2 I would hold
unc onstttuUonal.

§

5 of the Act

FOOTNOTES
1. More fully, Mr. Justice Black stated:
"Section 5, by providing that some of the States
cannot pass state laws or adopt state constitutional
amendments without first being compelled to beg
federal authorities to approve their policies, so
distorts our constitutional structure of government
as to render any distinction drawn in the Constitution
between state and federal power almost meaningless. "
~~th Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, 383 U.s., at
358.
2. While, as the majority points out, ante, p. 6-7,
Congress may be thought to have acquiesced in Allen by reenacting
the Voting Rights Act in 1970, I submit that the Court's 1971
decision in Perkins placing annexation within the scope of

§

5

merits reexamination as a matter of legislative intent.
3. In !llen,

~upra,

Mr. Justice Black addressed the

punitive nature of a federal statute which singles out a few states
in a manner which he described as "reminiscent of old
reconstruction days," going on to say that: "I had thought that the
whole nation had long since repented of the application of this
'conquered province' concept. " 393

U.s.,

at 595.
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MR. Jus'l'ICE WHITE, dissenting.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provides
that a State may not put into effect any change in voting
qualifications or voting standards, practices or procedures
until it either procures a declaratory judgment from
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to the effect that the alteration does not have the
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color or submits the alteration to the Attorney General and an objection has not been interposed by that official during
the ensuing 60 days. In this case, the Attorney General
interposed an objection on March 24, 1972, to the March
9 reapportionment plan of the Georgia House of Representatives and shortly thereafter sued to enjoin the
use of that plan on the ground that the State had obtained neither the approval of the Attorney General nor
that of the District Court. The District Court held § 5
was applicable to changes in state apportionment plans
and that the section prevented the March 9 reapportionment from going into effect.
I agree that in the light of our prior cases and congressional reenactment ;t § 5, that section 1~ be held
to ~1ent statutes. Contrary to
the Court, however, it is my view that the Attorney General did not interpose an objection contemplated by § 5

72- 75- DISSENT
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and that there was therefore no barrier to the March 9
reapportionment going into effect.
It is arguable from the sparse language of the Act,
which merely says that the State's modification will go
into effect unless the Attorney General enters an objection, that any objection whatsoever filed by that official
will suffice to foreclose effectiveness of the new legislation
and force the State into the District Court with the burden
of proving that its law is not unconstitutional. I cannot believe, however, that Congress intended to visit upon
the States the consequences of such uncontrolled discretion in the Attorney General. Surely, objections by the
Attorney General would not be valid if that officer considered himself too busy to give attention to § 5 submissions and simply decided to object to all of them, to
one out of 10 of them or to those filed by States with
governors of a different political persuasion. Neither, I
think, did Congress anticipate that the Attorney General
would play dog in the manger and refuse or plead his
inability to make up his mind as to whether a proposed
change in election procedures would have the forbidden
discriminatory effect. It is far more realistic and reasonable to assume that Congress expected the Attorney General to give his careful and good faith to § 5 submissions
and witb.,in 60 days after receiving all information he
deems necessary, to make up his mind as to whether the
proposed change did or· did not have a discriminatory
purpos~;.~r effect and if it did, to object thereto.
Although the constitutionality of § 5 has long since
been upheld, South Carolina v:Katzenbach, 383 U. S.
301 (1966), it remains a serious matter that a sovereign ~
·
State must subm1t 1 s eg1sla 10n to federal authonties
before 1 may a ·e e ec . t is even more senous to insi~igation and carry the burden of
proof as to constitutionality simply because the State
has employed a particular test or device and a sufficiently
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low percentage of its citizens has voted in its elections.
And why should the State be forced to shoulder that
burden where its proposed change is so colorless that the
country's highest legal officer professes his inability to
make up his mind as to its legality? If he is to object,
must he not himself conclude that the proposed change
will have the forbidden purpose or effect? Given such a
proper objection, the matter would take on a familiar adversary cast; and there would then appear to be solid
basis-at least the probable cause that a federal charge
usually imports-for insisting on judicial clearance.
Moreover, the issues between the State and the United
States, as well as the litigative burden the State would
have to bear, could be known and examined and intelligent decision made as to whether to institute suit in the
District Court. As it is, the State may be left more or
less at sea; for the Attorney General need merely announce, rather grandly, that he is not at all convinced
that the law submitted to him is not discriminatory.
My idea as to the obligation of the Department of
Justice with respect to a submission under § 5 is similar
to what Congress itself has provided in § 4. Under that
provision, a State otherwise covered by the Act can
terminate coverage as to it by securing a declaratory
judgment that no discriminatory test or device has been
used during the past 10 years. In that litigation, the
section goes on to provide, the Attorney General must
consent to the entry of such a judgment if "he has no
reason to believe" that a discriminatory test or device
has been used during the 10 years preceding the filing of
the action. Thus, in even the far more important context of determining whether a State is in any respect
covered by the Act, the Attorney General, if he is to
object to a decree favorable to the State, must have reason to believe, and so state, that tests or devices with
the prohibited effect have been employed in the past.

~-
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Surely, where the issue is not termination, vel non, but
the purpose and effect of a single statute, regulation or
other modification of voting procedures, it is not untoward to insist that the Attorney General not object
to the implementation of the change until and unless he·
has reason to believe that the amendment has the pro-·
hibited purpose or effect. He should not be able to
object by simply saying that he cannot make up his mind
or that the evidence is in equipoise.

March 30, 1973

No. 72-75 Georgia v . United States
Dear Potter:
I write merely to say that I have not yet decided what to do in
this case.
As I have stated on more than one occasion, I consider the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 - limited as it is to a handful of states rather
than applying to the entire country -to be discriminatory and indefensible
sectional rather than national legislation. I agree with Justice Black's
dissent in Katzenbach. I have even stronger feelings as to Perkins, which
extended - quite without justification in my opinion- the Act to annexation
in a way that does grievous harm to the orderly development of urban communities, certainly in states like Virginia .
Yet, these are established precedents and in the end I will either
join Byron's narrow dissent, or concur in the result reached in your
opinion accompanied by a brief statement that I do so only by virtue of
feeling bound by decisions with which I totally disagree.
I will only add, lest I be misunderstood, that I would have no objec tion (constitutionally or from the viewpoint of protecting the rights of
all citizens to vote) to a carefully drawn Voting Rights Act which applied
uniformly to all fifty states. It should exclude apportionment and annexation, and also should eliminate the offensive requirement that- as Byron
suggests - states, hat in hand, obtain the consent of the Attorney General
or run the gauntlet of the federal court here in the District before an act
of the state legislature may go into effect. The normal procedures available for testing the validity of state statutes should have sufficed.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stewart
cc : The Confer ence

lfp/ss lee 3/31/73

No. 72-75 GEORGIA v. UNITED STATES
MR. JUSTICE POWELL concurring in dissenting opinion
of MR. JUSTICE WHITE.
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with Mr. Justice
White that the Attorney General did not comply with § 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment
act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is indeed a serious
intrusion, incompatible in the most fundamental sense with the basic
structure of our federal system, to compel a state to submit its
legislation for review by federal authorities in advance of its effectiveness.
As a minimum, assuming the constitutionality of the Act, the Attorney
General should be required to comply with it explicitly and only when
he makes an affirmative evidentiary finding rather than an ambivalent
one.
The constitutionality of this act, and particularly § 5 thereof
has been upheld. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)•

•.'

2.
Subsequent decisions have extended the applicability of

§

5 far beyond

what rationally may have been thought to be its original intendment:
To legislative reapportionments in Allen v. state Board of Elections,
393 U.S. 544 (196_), and even to annexation, the racially neutral

method long used (and often the only method available) of extending
the boundaries of a city to ameliorate the inevitable economic and
social problems of locking an urban community ucJb:laK within a
prescribed area. Perkins v. Matthews, I 400

u.s.

379 (197_)

Until such time as there may be a disposition of the Court to reconsider
these far reaching decisions, they are precedents of this Court binding
upon the states singled out by this Act and courts called upon to enforce
the Act. As this is my first opportunity as a Justice of this Court
to consider this Act, and particularly

§

5 thereof, I nevertheless deem

it appropriate to record my deep conviction that Mr. Justice Black
was profoundly right in his view that

§

5 "distorts" the fundamental

structure of the federal system so clearly prescribed by the
Constitution. While his entire dissenting opinion is commended

3.
for those who wished to be reminded of the system of government
intended to be established by the Constitution, I qucte only the
following brief exert>ts:
"Section 5, by providing that some of the States
cannot pass state laws or adopt state constitutional
amendments without first being compelled to beg
federal authorities to approve their policies, so
distorts our c cmstitutional structure of government
as to render any distint:tion drawn in the Constitution
between state and federal power almost meaningless.

****
"Moreover, it seems to me that § 5 which gives
federal officials power to veto state laws they do
not like is in direct conflitt with the clear command
of our Constitution that 'The United states shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government.' I cannct help but believe that
the inevitable effect of any such law which forces
any one of the State to entreat federal authorities
in far-away places for approval of local laws :titJtp:
before they can become effective is to create the
impression that the State or states treated in this
way are littleJDIIK more than conquered provinces."
383 U. s. at 358-360. *
*Mr. Justice Black made the relevant comment in one of his
footnctes that: "The requirement that States come to Washington
to their laws judged is reminiscent of the deeply resented practices
used by the English Crown in dealing with the American colonias."
383 u.S. at 359, note 2.

4.
Lest I be misunderstood by some, I emphasize that I have
no doubt whatever as to the power of the Congress under the Fifteenth
Amendment to enact appropriate legislation to assure that the rights
of citizens to vote shall not be denied, abridged or infringed in any
way "on account of race, color or previous coodition of servitude. "
Indeed, in my view there is more than the power to enact such
legislation, indeed there is a duty. Nor am I insensitive to the fact
that various means, both overt and more subtle, have been employed
to deny voting rights edt on racial grounds, and these indefensible
practices have been more prevalent in some states and section of
our country than in others.
My conviction that this particular act is unconstitutional is
not, therefore, in any respect related to disagreement with the
professed objective of assuring full equal opportunity to vote in
every state and political subdivision thereof. Rather, my objecti'ons
are based solely on the constitutional infirmities in the way this
act was drafted and the way it has been construed. It was written

\
/

5.
not as the type of national legislation applicable to all states one
would expect from the federal Congress, but to impose on a few
states deemed to be the worst offenders limitations not made

.,..
applicable to other states.

In addition, as eloquently stated by

Mr. Justice Black,

§

5 of the Act is unprecedented in the sense

of compelling the few states against which the Act is directed to
seek, in advance, what in effect is an advisory opinion from the
federal government:
"It is hard for me to believe that a juHUkM>
justiciable controversy can arise in the constitutional
sense from the desire by the United states government
or some of its officials to determine in advance what
legislative provisions a state may enact or what
constitutional amendments it may adopt." 383 U.S.
at 357.

*:tit th~i· subsequent case of Allen v. State Board of Electicns, 393 U.s.
544, at 595, Mr. Justice Black addressed specifically the punitive
nature of a federal statute which singles out a few states in a manner
whicJt he described as "reminiscent of old reconstruct101Ul days",
going on to say that: "I had thought that the whole nation had long ,
since repented of the application of this 'conquered province' concePt."
Speaking more affirmatively, no one can doubt the correctness of
Mr. Justice Black's further statement that the Constttution would
never have been ratified, nor the original colonies ''willing to agree
to a constitution that gave the federal government power to force
one colony to go through such onerous procedure while all the other
former colonies, now supposedly its sister states were allowed to
retain their full sovereignty. Ibid at 596.

B.
Moreover, opinions of this Court have added gloss to the
act hardly intended by the Congress. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting
in

~!len,

spoke of the "revolutionary innovation in American

government" accomplished by the Court's ccnstruction of
~lle.!l

v.

Bta:.!!J3.oa~d

§

5.

of Education, supra at 58 5. He went on to say:

"In moving against 'tests and devices' in § 4 [the Aet]
Congress moved only against those techniques that
prevented Negroes from voting at all. Congress did
not attempt to restructure state governments. The
Court now reads § 5, however, as vastly increasing
the sphere of federal intervention beyond that
contemplated by § 4, despite the fact that the two
provisions were designed t simply to interlock.

****
"The Court's construction of § 5 is even more
surprising in light of the Act 1 s regional application.
For the statute, as the Court now construes it, deals
with a problem that is national in scope. I find it
especially difficult to believe that CongrelBs would
single out a handfult of states as requiring stricter
federal supervision concerning their treatment of a
problem that may well just as serious in parts of the
North as it is in the South." 393 U.S. at 585, 586.
In Perkins v. Matthews, a majority of the Court, following

the logic of the earlier decisioo.s, further extended the Act to apply
to changes (i) in location of polling of places; (ii) from ward to
at-large election of town aldermen, and (iii) in municipal boundaries

7.
through annexation, bringing into the city of Canton, Mississippi,
a negligible number of new voters. *
Harlan commented that ''the Court's opinion&
ease are devoid of evidence of a legislative intent tt..
state's election law and to reach matters such as annexath.
affect voting only incidentally and peripherally." Perkins, supra.
at 398.
Even in cases involving close and difficult questions of
constitutional law, I normally feel tDall: bound to follow decisions
of the Court with which I disagree unless and until at least a majority
of the Court wished to reexamine and reconsider a constitutional
question. There is often merit to finality of decision even with
~'Three -separate,

and minor changes, in the city's boundaries by
annexation, were found to violate the Act. Oee of these added 46
Negro voters, and no white voters; the second added 28 Negro
voters and 187 white voters; and the final anne:xatim added 8
Negro voters and 144 whites -making total of 82 new Negro voters
and 331 new white voters in a city the voting population of which
totaled 2, 794 Negro voters and 2, 052 white voters, resulting in fact - in no alteration of the racial balance of voting strength.
-~-~!klns, supra, dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black, at 403,404.

8.
respect to a dubious resolution of a constitutional question, especially
where - by legislation or idiiiDt" otherwise - our nation has adjusted
to the decision. But it seems to me, for the reasons expressed and
never adequately answered by Justices Black and Jllldaii:i Harlan
that the sustaining of

§

5 of this Act, and its expanded interpretation,

do constitute such a "revolutionary innovation in American government"*·

and
that a reconsideration of these cases is overdue.

\

\

\
\

\

\\

\

\

\

\
\

*Mr-: Justic-e Harlan dissenting, Allen v. state Board of Elections,
s_~rf! at 585.

\\
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\
\
\
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No. 72-75 GEORGIA v. UNITED STATES
MR. JUSTICE POWELL concurring in dissenting opinion
of MR. JUSTICE WHITE.
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with Mr.
Justice White that the Attorney General did not comply with

§

5 of

the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is indeed a
serious intrusion, incompatible in a fundamental sense with the basic
structure of our system, for federal authorities to compel a state
to submit its legislation for advance review. As a minimum, assuming
the constitutionality of the Act, the Attorney General should be
required to comply with

u; explicitly and to invoke its provisions

only when he is able to make an affirmative finding rather than an
ambivalent one.

has been upheld by a divided Court.

South Carolina v. Katzenbach,

2.
383 U.S. 301 (1966).
applicability of

§

Subsequent decisions have extended the

5 far beyond what reasonably may have been thought

to be its original intendment.

See, e. g., Allen v. state Board of

Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (196_).
U. S. 379 ( 197_), the reach of

§

And in Perkins v. Matthews, 400
5 was stretched to include

annexation, the racially neutral method long used (and often the only
method available) of extending the boundaries of a city l!li: to ameliorate
the inevitable economic problems resulting from locking an urban
community within a prescribed area.

Until such time as the Court

may be disposed to reconsider these far reaching decisions, they
1-tJz_,

are precednts binding upon the courts called upon to enforce -ftftd
~~.

Act and upon the states singled out byJttte--AGt.V f As this is my first
opportunity as a Justice of this Court to consider this Act, and
particularly

~

§

5 thereof, I deem it appropriate to record my conviction

that
that Mr. Justice Black was right in his view/l!li: § 5 "distorts" the
fundamental structure of the federal system so clearly prescribed

u
by the Constitution.

~s-entire-dis~nting

opinion is commended

'

.

3.

to those who wish to refresh their understanding of the dual
structure of government established by the Constitution.
~

~

Lest I be misunderstood, I emphasize that I have no doubt

as to the power of the Congress under the Fifteenth Amendment to
enact appropriate legislation to assure that the rights of citizens
to vote shall not be denied, abridged or infringed in any way "on
account of race, color or previous condition of servitude."
Indeed, in my view there is more than the power to enach such
legislation, there is a duty.

Nor am I insensisitive to the fact that

various means, both overt and subtle, have been employed to deny
voting rights on racial grounds, and these indefensible practices
have been more prevalent in some states and sections of our country
than in others.
My conviction that

§

5 of this Act is egregiously unconstitutional

is not, therefore, in any respect related to disagreement with the
objective of assuring full equal opportunity to vote in every state
and political subdivision thereof.

Rather, my objections are

4.
based solely on the constitutional infirmities in the way this
Act was drafted and the way it has been construed. It was written,
in certain of its provisions, not as the type of national legislation
applicable to all states one would expect from the Federal Congress,
but to impose on a few states deemed to be the worst offenders
2

limitations and restraints not made applicable to other states.
Moreover, in Perkins, supra,

a~

majority of

of the Court extended the Act to apply to changes (i) in location
of polling places, (ii) from ward to at-large election of town
aldermen, and (iii) in municipal boundaries through annexation,
bringing into the city of Canton, Mississippi, a negligible number
of new voters.

In dissenting Mr. Justice Harlan commented
1

that "the Court's opinions in both Allen and this case are devoid
of evidence of a legislative intent to go beyond the state's
election law and to reach matters such as annexations, which
affecting voting only incidentally and peripherally. " Perkins,
supra, at 398.

5.
'

I would have thought, until the Court spoke in Allen and
Perkins, that Mr. Justice Harlan's point was unanswerable.

The

Act, by its language and history, was directed against the "tests
and devices" and other techniques (notably "literacy tests" and
"poll taxes") employed most frequently, but not solely, in some
of the southern states to deny the right of minorities to vote. But
§

5 has now been held to apply to conduct which is common to all

of the states; to annexation and reapportionment, most significantly;
but also to relocating polling :k places (a necessity as

arm: population

shifts within a city or county), to changes from ward to at-large
elections of city or town councilmen (a reform in municipal
government long recommended by leading authorities, especially
for small and medium size communities), and to any shift from
single to multi-member elections :mx of state legislators.

These

commonplace changes, often essential to meet neutral and nonracial needs, are not unique to the few states targeted by discriminatory
legislation.

They are as national in usage as state and local govern4

ment itself.

6.
I normally feel i bound to follow prior decisions of the
Court with which I disagree unless and until at least a majority
wishes to reexamine and reconsider a constitutional issue.
There is merit to finality of decision even with respect to a dubious
resolution of a constitutional question, especially where
~

-by~

legislation or otherwise - our nation has adjusted to the

decision. But it seems to me, for the reasons expressed by Justices
Black and Harlan, and never adequately answered, that the
I

and its expanded interpretation,
5
~~constitute

a :X "revolutionary innovation in American government".
6

A reconsideration of these cases is overdue.

•'
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'
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FOOTNOTES

1.

The essence of Mr. Justice Black's reasoning :im: is

contained in the following excerpts from his opinion:
a

!JJ

'

/

' Section 5, by providing that some of the States
cannot pass state laws or adopt state constitutional
amendments without first being compelled to beg
federal authorities to approve their policies, so
distorts our constitutional structure of government
as to render any distinction drawn in the Constitution
between state and federal power almost meaningless.

****
"Moreover, it seems to me that § 5 which gives
federal officials power to veto state laws they do
not like i1 in direct conflict with the clear command
of our Constitution that 'The United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government. ' I cannot help but believe that
the inevitable effect of any such law which forces
any one of the States to entreat federal authorities
in far-away places for approval of local laws before
they can become effective is to create the impression that the State or States treated in this way are
little more than conquered provinces. " 383 U. S.
at 358-360. 1

'!(

?<'

~

><"

Mr. Justice Black also

[

Rl!llDIXJtH:H::el

commented in one

of his footnotes that: "The requirement that states come to
Washington to have their laws judged is reminiscent of the deeply
resented practices used by the English Crown in dealing with the
American colonies. " 383 U. S. at 359, note 2.

I

2.

U

!

Three s eparate, and minor changes, in the city's

boundaries by annexation, were found to violate the Act. One of

l

these added 46 Negro voters, and no white voters; the second
added 28 Negro voters and 187 white voters; and the final annexation
added 8 Negro voters and 144 whites - making a total of 82 new Negro
voters and 331 new white voters in a city the voting population of
which totaled 2, 794 Negro voters and 2, 052 white voters.
%HB

The

result, held to be invalid, was no alteration of the racial

balance of voting strength.

Perkins, supra, dissenting opinion of

Mr. Justice Black, at 403, 404.

J·
14

In Allen, Mr. Justice Harlan already had spoken of the

"revolutionary innovation in American government" accomplished
by the Court's construction of

§

5.

Allen v. state Board of Education,

supra, at 58 5. He went on to say:

I

"In moving against 'tests and devices' in § 4 [the Act]
Congress moved only against those techniques that
prevented Negroes from voting at all. Congress did
not attempt to restructure state governments. The
Court now reads § 5, however, as vastly increasing
the sphere of federal intervention beyond that
contemplated by § 4, despite the fact that the two
provisions were designed simply to interlock.

\

!

3.

****

l
-

"The Court's construction of § 5 is even more
surprising in light of the Act's regional application.
For the statute, as the Court now construes it, deals
with a problem that is national in scope. I find it
especially difficult to believe that Congress would
single out a handful of states as requiring stricter
federal supervision concerning their treatment of a
problem that may well :jlx be just as serious in parts
of the North as it is in the South. " 383 U. S. at
585, 586. (Italics supplied)

4. Who could suggest seriously, for example, that
annexation or changing a JIDtnnUc precinct polling location in

I

Cairo, Illinois, or Gary, Indiana - or indeed in almost any other
city - might not "have the effect of denying or abridfu g the right
t\
to vote on account of race" ( § 5) to the same extent as such an
event might have in the few states selected for this unique federal
overseeing of state and local legislative action.

I

I

'

.

4.

:m.

5. Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting, Allen v. state Board
of Elections, supra at 585.
6.

Mr. Justice Douglas, in his Cardozo Lecture :bamiK

:klitiDua before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York

spoke of the duty of new Justices in relation to stare decisis:
"The place of stare decisis in constitutional law
is even more tenuous. A judge looking at a constituational decision may have compulsions to revere
past history and accept what was once written. But
he remembers above all else that it is the Constitution
which he swore to support and defend, not the gloss
which his predecessors may have put on it. So he
comes to formulate his own views, rejecting some
earlier ones as false and embracing others. He
cannot do otherwise unless he lets men long dead
and unaware of the problems of the age in which he
lives do his thinking for him.
"This re-examination of precedent in
constitutional law is a personal matter for each
judge who comes along. When only one new judge
is appointed during a short period; the unsettling
effect in constitutional law may not be great. But
when a majority of a Court is ~
suddenly reconstituted, there is likely to be a
substantial unsettlement. There will be unsettlement until the new judges have taken their positions
on constitutional doctrine. During that time -which
may extend a decade or more - constitutional law
will be in a flux. This is the necessary consequence
of our system and to my mind a healthy one. "
The Record of the Association, Vol. 4 (1949),
pp. 152-179.
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No. 72-75 GEORGIA v. UNITED STATES
MR. JUSTICE POWELL concurring in dissenting opinion
of MR. JUSTICE WHITE.
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with Mr.
Justice White that the Attorney General did not comply with

§

5 of

the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is indeed a
serious intrusion, incompatible in a fundamental sense with the basic
structure of our system for federal authorities to compel a state
to submit its legislation for advance review. As a minimum, assuming
the constitutionality of the Act, the Attorney General should be
required to comply with its explicitly and to invoke its provisions
only when he is able to make an affirmative finding rather than an
ambivalent one.
The constitutionality of this Act, and particularly

§

5 thereof,

has been upheld by a divided Court. South Carolina v. Katzenbach,

. .

2•

383 U.S. 301 (1966). Subsequent decisions have extended the
applicability of

§

5 far beyond what reasonably may have been thought

to be its original intendment. See, e. g., Allen v. state Board of
~~~tions,

393 U.S. 544 (196_). And in Perkins v. Matthews, 400

U.s. 379 (197_), the reach of

§

5 was stretched to include

annexation, the racially neutral method long used (and often the only
method available) of extending the boundaries of a city :at to ameliorate
the inevitable economic problems resulting from locking an urban
community within a prescribed area. Until such time as the

Cour~
I

may be disposed to reconsider these far reaching decisions, they
are precednts binding upon the courts called upon to enforce and

\
Act and upon the states singled out by the Act. As this is my first '
opportunity as a Justice of this Court to consider this Act, and
particularly

§

5 thereof, I deem it appropriate to record my conviction

that
that Mr. tTustice Black was right in his view/ld § 5 "distorts" the
I

I

fundamental structure of the federal system so clearly prescribed

I

by the Constitution. While his entire dissenting opinion is commended

3.
to those who wish to ti!B refresh their understanding of the dual
structure of government established by the Constitution. I will
quote only the following excerpts:
"Section 5, by providing that some of the states
cannot pass state laws or adopt state constitutional
amendments without first being compelled to beg
federal authorities to approve their policies, so
distorts our constitutional structure of government
as to render any distinction drawn in the Constitution
between state and federal power almost meaningless.

****
/

''Moreover, it seems to me that § 5 which gives
federal officials power to veto state laws they do
not like iS'in direct conflict with the clear command
of our Constitution that 'The United states shall
guarantee to every state in this Union a Republican
Form of Government. ' I cannot help but believe that
the inevitable effect of any such law which forces
any one of the states to entreat federal authorities
in far-away places for approval of local laws before
they can become effective is to create the impression that the State or States treated in this way are
little more than conquered provinces. " 383 U. S.
at 358-360. 1
Lest I be misunderstood, I emphasize that I have no doubt
whatever as to the power of the Congress under the Fifteenth
Amendment to enact appropriate legislation to assure that the rights
of citizens to vote shall not be denied, abridged or infringed in any
way "on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude."

4.
Indeed, in my view there is more than the power to enact such
legislation, there is a duty. Nor am I insensitive to the fact that
various means, both overt and subtle, have been employed to deny
voting rights on racial grounds, and these indefensible practices
have been more prevalent in some states and sections of our country
than in others.
My conviction that this

§

5 of this Act is egregiously

unconstitutional is not, therefore, in any respect related to disagreement
with the objective of assuring full equal opportunity to vote in every
state and political subdivision thereof. Rather, mya objections
are based solely on the constitutional infirmities in the way this
Act was drafted and the way it has been construed. In was written,
in certain of its provisions, not as to type of national legislation

applicable to all states one would expect from the Federal Congress,
rut to impose on a few states deemed to be the worst offenders
2

limitations and restraints not mdde applicable to other states.
In addition, as stated by Mr. Justice Black, § 5 of the Act is

unprecedented in the sense of compelling the few states against

5.
which the Act is directed to seek, in advance, what in effect is an
advisory opinion from the federal government as to validity of their
legislative acts:
II

[rJt

'« is hard for me to believe that a justiciable

controversy can arise in the constitutional sense
from the desire by the United states government
or some of its officials to determine in advance
what legislative provisions a state may enact or
what constitutional amendments it may adopt. "
383 U.S. at 357.
Moreover, opinions of this Court have added gloss to the Act
hardly intended by the Congress. In Perkins v. Matthews, a majority
of the Court, following the logic of the :lldi: earlier decisions, extended
the Act to apply to changes (i) in location of polling places, (11) from
ward to at-large election of town alderman, and (iii) in municipal
boundaries through »>iiiJJ!!IItB: annexation, bringing into the city of
3

Canton, Mississippi, a

~

negligible number of new voters.

In dissenting Mr. Me Justice Harlan commented that ''the Court's

opinions in both Allen and this ease are devoid of evidence of a
legislative intent to go beyond the a•ltatiJa:a state's election law
and to reach matters such as annexations, which affecting voting
only incidentally and peripherally. " Perkins, supra, at 398.

6.
In

~llen..z

Mr. Justice Harlan already had spoken of the

"revolutionary innovation in American government" accomplished
by the Court's construction of § 5.

Allen v. state Board of Education,

supra, at 585. He went on to say:
"In moving against 'tests and devices' in § 4 [the Act]
Congress moved only against those techniques that
prevented Negroes from voting at all. Congress did
not attempt to restructure state governments. The
Court now reads § 5, however, as vastly increasing
the sphere of federal intervention beyond that
contemplated by § 4, despite the fact that the two
provisions were designed simply to interlock.

••••
"The Court's construction of § 5 is even more
surprising in light of the Act's regional application.
Fo! the statute, as the Court now construes ita deals
~ith a problem that is national in scope. I fin if
especially difficult to believe that Congress would
single out a handful of states as requiring stricter
federal supervision concerning their treatment of a
problem that may well jlx be just as serious in parts
of the North as it is in the South. " 383 U. s. at
585, 586. (Italics supplied)

I would have thought, until the Court spoke in Allen that
Mr. Justice Harlan's point was unanswerable. The Act, by its
language and history, was directed against the ''tests and devices"
and other techniques (notably "literacy tests" and "poll taxes")

,.

7.
employed most frequently, but not soley, in some of the southern
states to deny the right of minorities to vote. But

§

5 has now been

held to apply to conduct which is common to all of the states;
annexation and reapportionment, most SldrK significantly; but also
to relocating polling places (a necessity as population shifts within
a city or county), to changes from ward to at-large elections of city
or town concilmen (a reform in municipal government long recommended by leading authorities, especially for small and medium
size communities), and to any shift from single to multi-member
electioos of state legislators. These commonplace changes, often
essential to meet neutral and non-racial needs, are not iDd.ea
unique to the few states a:itJ singled out as the targets of this
discriminatory legislation. They are as national in usage as state
4

and local government itself.
In cases involving close and difficult questions of
constitutional law, I normally feel bound to follow prior decisions
of the Court with which I oa:iaqJia disagree unless and until at least

8.

a majority wishes to reexamine and reconsider the constitutional
iuUilXJ.et

issue. There is often merit to finality of decision even with

respect to a dubious resolution of a constitutional questim, especially
where - by legislation or otherwise - our nation has adjusted to the
decision. But it seems to me, for the reasons expressed by Justices
Black and Harlan, and never adequate answered, that the sustaining
of '§ 5 of this Act, and its expanded interpretation, do constitute a
5

"revolution innovation in American government".
6

of these cases is overdue.

A reconsideration

FOOTNOTES

1. Mr. Justice Black also IOIIJI'XIXCIIJIB commented in one

of his footnotes that: "The requirement that states come to
Washington to have their laws judged is reminiscent of the deeply
resented practices used by the English Crown in dealing with the
American colonies. " 383
i

393

at 359, note 2.

/

/ 2.

-

u.S.

In

IL£.~ at 5'95,

Mr. Justice Black

addressed~

the punitive nature of a federal statute which singles out a few
states in a manner which he described as "reminiscent of old
reconstruction days", going on the say that: "I had thought that the
whole nation had long since LepeEtaJI repented of the application of

this 'conquered province' concept.
of Mr.

~Tustice

~o one can doubt the correctness

Black's further statement that the Constitution would

never have been ratified, nor the original ~ Colonies
"willing to agree to a constitution that 3t.vB gave the federal government power to force one Colony to go through such onerous procedure
while all the other former Colonies, now supposedly its sister states,

J

were allowed to retain tlllel:r full sovereignty." Ibid. at 596.

2.
3. Three spparate, and minor changes, in the city's
boundaries by annexation, were found to violate the Act. One of
these added 46 Negro voters, and no white voters; the second
added 28 Negro voters and 187 white voters; and the final annexation
added 8 Negro voters and 144 whites - making a total of 82 new Negro
voters and 331 new white voters in a city the voting population of
which
DB

totaled~,

794 Negro voters and 2, 052 white voters. The

result, held to be invalid, was no alteration of the racial

balance of voting strength. Perkins, supr!r_ dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Black, at 403, 404.
4. Who could suggest seriously, for example, that
annexation or changing a px•••Kk precinct polling location in
Cairo, Illinois, or Gary, Indiana - or indeed in almost any other
city - might not "have the effect of denying or abriding the right
to vote on account of race" ( § 5) to the same extent as such an
event might have in the few states selected for this unique federal
overseeing of state and local legislative action.

3.
5. Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting, Allen v. State Board

6. Mr. Justice Douglas, in his Cardozo Lecture :balm:
»dJla:a: before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York

spoke of the duty of new Justices in relation to stare decisis:
"The place of stare decisis in constitutional law
is even more tenuous--:--A judge looking at a constituational decision may have compulsions to revere
past history and accept what was once written. But
he remembers above all else that it is the Constitution
which he swore to support and defend, not the gloss
which his predecessors may have put on it. So he
comes to formulate his own views, rejecting some
earlier ones as false and embracing others. He
cannot do otherwise unless he lets men long dead
and unaware of the problems of the age in which he
lives do his thinking for him.
"This re-examination of precedent in
constitutional law is a personal matter for each
judge who comes along. When only one new ud
is appointed during a short period, e unse ling
effect in constitutional law may not be great. But
when a majority of a Court is daaxsalblelf.tbyx
suddenly reconstituted, there is likely to be a
substantial unsettlement. There will be unsettlement until the new judges have taken their positions
on constitutional doctrine. During that time -which
may extend a decade or more - constitutional law
will be in a flux. This is the necessary consequence
of our system and to my mind a healthy one •..!.'
The Record of the Association, Vol. 4 (1949),
pp. 152-179.

'

.

4.

Indeed, in my view there is more than the power to enact such
legislation, there is a duty. Nor am I insensitive to the fact that
various means, both overt and subtle, have been employed to deny
voting rights on racial grounds, and these indefensible practices
have been more prevalent in some states and sections of our country
than in others.
My conviction that tl;t6

§

5 of this Act is egregiously

unconstitutional is not, therefore, in any respect related to disagreement
with the objective of assuring full equal opportunity to vote in every
state and political subdivision thereof. Rather, my» objections
are based solely on the constitutional infirmities in the way this
Act was drafted and the way it has been construed. In was written,

Hu.in certain of its provisions, not
applicable to all states one

as~

\\U uld

A

type of national legislation

expect from the Federal Congress,

but to impose on a few states deemed to be the worst offenders
2

limitations and restraints not made applicable to other states.
y Mr. Justice Blac ,
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unprecedented inJt~~~~~~~~MR~~

§
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which=tl::l:e=A.ct is dit'cetea~~
tie seck, in advance, what in effect is an
A

1-(._,z_
from the federal government as to validity of thci
legislative acts:

'''r'
I..•':J+

•

I

I

I

I

- is hard fof me to believe at a justiciable
controversy fan arise in t constitutional sc sc
from the des rc by the U ted states govcrnm nt
or some of it officials o determine in advanc
what lcgislah c prov· ions a state may enact or
what constitut na mcndmcnts it may adopt."
383 U. S. at 357.
ourt have added gloss to the Ac

Moreover,

hardly intended by the Congrcs .

a majority

the Act to apply to changes (i) in· location of polling places, (ii) from
ward to at-large election of town alderman, and (iii) in municipal
boundaries

through~

Canton, Mississippi, a

annexation, bringing into the city of

~gk

negligible number of new voters.

In dissenting Mr. ilk Justice Harlan commented that "the Court's

opinions in both Allen and this case arc devoid of evidence of a
legislative intent to go beyond

thc~SJB:

state's election law

and to reach matters such as annexations, which affecting voting

~

only incidentally and peripherally. " Perkins, supra, at 398.

7.
employed most frequently, but not soley, in some of the southern
states to deny the right of minorities to vote. But

§

5 has now been

held to apply to conduct which is common to all of the states; --/?::>
annexation and reapportionment, most

~significantly;

but also

to relocating polling places (a necessity as population shifts within
a city or county), to changes from ward to at-large elections of city
or town concilmen (a reform in municipal government long recommended by leading authorities, especially for small and medium
size communities), and to any shift from single to multi-member
elections of state legislators. These commonplace changes, often
essential to meet neutral and non-racial needs, are not :iD::Bl

rmique to the few

state~'::1:.:!'J.e ~s ru this

discriminatory legislation.

They are as national in usage as state
4

and local government itself.
In eases-involving close aHel diffiettlt-questimrs of

Cf{
-eonstitut-i-onal-ta-w., I normally feel bound to follow prior decisions
of the Court with which

I~

disagree unless and until at least

8.
CL-

a majority wishes to reexamine and reconsider .tae constitutional
~

issue.

There is

~

merit to finality of decision even with

respect to a dubious resolution of a constitutional question, especially
where - by legislation or otherwise - our nation has adjusted to the
decision.

But it seems to me, for the reasons expressed by Justices

Black and Harlan, and never adequate answered, that the sustaining
of

§

5 of this Act, and its expanded interpretation, do constitute a

"revolutio~ovation in American government".
1\

6

of these cases is overdue.

5
A reconsideration
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No. 72-75 GEORGIA v. UNITED STATES
MR. JUSTICE POWELL concurring in dissenting opinion
of MR. JUSTICE WHITE.
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with Mr.
Justice White that the Attorney General did not comply with

§

5 of

the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is indeed a
serious intrusion, incompatible in a fundamental sense with the basic
structure of our system/for federal authorities to compel a state
to submit its legislation for advance review. As a minimum, assuming
the constitutionality of the Act, the Attorney General should be
required to comply with it~ explicitly and to invoke its provisions
only when he is able to make an affirmative finding rather than an
ambivalent one.

has been upheld by a divided Cour}

South Carolina v. Katzenbach,

2.
~c9-

A

383 U. S. 301 (1966~ ,Subsequent decisions have extended the
applicability of

§

5 far beyond what reasonably may have been thought

to be its original intendment.

See, e. g., Allen v. state Board of

Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (196

Matthews, 400
- ). A.mt_9n Perkins v. --

U.S. 379 (197_), the reach of § 5 was stretched to include
annexation, the racially neutral method long used (and often the only
method available) of extending the boundaries of a city :&X to ameliorate
the inevitable economic problems resulting from locking an urban
community within a prescribed area.

Until such time as the Court

may be disposed to reconsider these far reaching decisions, they
I

i-1&--

)l_

are precednts binding upon the courts called upon to enforce iiWiMi
~

~

opportunity as a Justice of this Court to consider this Act, and
-~

<.__

particularly

§

5 thereof, I deem it appropriate to record my conviction
I

that
that Mr. Justice Black was right in his view/:&X § 5 "distorts" the
fundamental structure of the federal system so clearly prescribed

JJ

by the Constitution. .\l'II.z:l~~~~~tl!i"ll!s~e=ntttui~!!.Ee.dwliriiiilii!SrEe~a.tibHi"~H!P€gFe9j_f'~H~1~~~""'~:*'~·,~,~''IT~i~"~§~iii:r:l~iEI&l~
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3.

rpml<'ll Lest I be misunderstood,

I emphasize that I have no doubt

as to the power of the Congress under the Fifteenth Amendment to
enact appropriate legislation to assure that the rights of citizens
to vote shall not be denied, abridged or infringed in any way "on
account of race, color or previous condition of servitude. "
Indeed, in my view there is more than the power to enact ' such
legislation, there is a duty.

Nor am I insensisitive to the fact that

various means, both overt and subtle, have been employed to deny
voting rights on racial grounds, and these indefensible practices
have been more prevalent in some states and sections of our country
than in others.
My conviction that

§

5 of this Act is egregiously unconstitutional

is not, therefore, in any respect related to disagreement with the
objective of assuring full equal opportunity to vote in every state
and political subdivision thereof.

Rather, my objections are

4.
based solely on the constitutional infirmities in the way this

~~

Act was dFaft£!d and the way it has been
LFP, Jr. :psf 4/19/ 73

constr~ It was wn

Rider A, p. 4 Ga. v. U.S.

As Mr. Justice Black stated, the power vested in federal
officials to veto state laws in advance of their effectiveness
"distorts our constitutional structure of government." Allen,
supra, at 358. Moreover, the Act is unprecedented in the sense
that it imposes on a few selected states, deemed to be the worst
offenders, limitations and prior restraints not made applicable to
other states.

2

2
In dissenting Mr. Justice Harlan commented

of new voters.

that "the Court's opinions in both Allen and this case are devoid
of evidence of a legislative intent to go beyond the state's
election law and to reach matters such as annexations, which

d

affectiftg voting only incidentally and peripherally. " Perkins,
I

supra, at 398.
/

5.
I would have thought, until the Court spoke in Allen and
~· ·

Perkins, that Mr. Justice

~

Harlan's~ was
/\

unanswerable.

The

Act, by its language and history, was directed against the "tests
and devices" and other techniques (notably "literacy tests" and
"poll taxes") employed most frequently, but not solely, in

som~e

~~~

of the southern states to deny the right of minorities to vote. But
§

5 has now been held to apply to conduct which is common to all

of the states; to annexation and reapportionment, most significantly;
but also to relocating polling k places (a necessity as cqm: population
shifts within a city or county), to changes from ward to at-large
elections of city or town councilmen (a reform in municipal
government long recommended by leading authorities, especially
for small and medium size communities), and to any shift from
single to multi-member elections m: of state legislators.

These

commonplace changes, often essential to meet neutral and non-

~

racial needs, are not unique to the few states targeted by discriminatory
1\

legislation.

They are as national in usage as state and local govern4

ment itself.

6.
~

I normally feel X: bmmd to follow prior decisions of the
Court with which I disagree unless and until at least a majority
wishes to reexamine and reconsider a constitutional issue.
There is merit to finality of decision even with respect to a dubious
resolution of a constitutional question, especially where -by
~legislation

~

or otherwise - our nation has adjusted to the

decision. But it seems to me, for the reasons expressed by Justices
Black and Harlan, and never adequately answered, that the
I

'8Jdoxtad:m sustaining of § 5 of this Act, and its expanded interpretation,
~~constitute

a

x "revolutionary innovation

5

in American government".

Areconsid:::~:;:~:.~

2.
;;.

~

Three s eparate, and minor changes, in the city's

boundaries by annexation, were found to violate the Act. One of

]

these added 46 Negro voters, and no white voters; the second
added 28 Negro voters and 187 white voters; and the final annexation
added 8 Negro voters and 144 whites - making a total of 82 new Negro
voters and 331 new white voters in a city the voting population of
which totaled 2, 794 Negro voters and 2, 052 white voters.
DB

The

result, held to be invalid, was no alteration of the racial

balance of voting strength.

Perkins, supra, dissenting opinion of

Mr. Justice Black, at 403, 404.

*~ In Allen,

Mr. Justice Harlan already had spoken of the

"revolutionary innovation in American government" accomplished
by the Court's construction of

§

5.

Allen v. state Board of Education,

supra, at 58 5. He went on to say:

I

"In moving against 'tests and devices' in § 4 [the Act]
Congress moved only against those techniques that
prevented Negroes from voting at all. Congress did
not attempt to restructure state governments. The
Court now reads § 5, however, as vastly increasing
the sphere of federal intervention beyond that
contemplated by § 4, despite the fact that the two
provisions were designed simply.to interlock.

\

I

3.

****

I

"The Court's construction of § 5 is even more
surprising in light of the Act's regional application.
For the statute, as the Court now construes it, deals
WITh a problem that is national in scope. I find it
especially difficult to believe that Congress would
single out a handful of states as requiring stricter
federal supervision concerning their treatment of a
problem that may well ~ be just as serious in parts
of the North as it is in the South. " 383 U. S. at
585, 586. (Italics supplied)

?#.

Who could suggest seriously, for example, that

annexation or changing a :pxeRRHk precinct polling location in

I

Cairo, Illinois, or Gary, Indiana - or indeed in almost any other

1
' '

city - might not ''have the effect of denying or abriding the right
I

I

'

to vote on account of race" ( § 5) to the same extent as such an
event might have in the few states selected for this unique federal
overseeing of state and local legislative action.

I

I
/

/

I

4.

:ia.

Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting, Allen v. State Board
of Elections, supra at 58 5.

1. .
~

Mr. Justice Douglas, in his Cardozo Lecture~

before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York

spoke of the duty of new Justices in relation to stare decisis:
"The place of stare decisis in constitutional law
is even more tenuous. A judge looking at a constituational decision may have compulsions to revere
past history and accept what was once written. But
he remembers above all else that it is the Constitution
which he swore to support and defend, not the gloss
which his predecessors may have put on it. So he
comes to formulate his own views, rejecting some
earlier ones as false and embracing others. He
cannot do otherwise unless he lets men long dead
and unaware of the problems of the age in which he
lives do his thinking for him.
"This re-examination of precedent in
constitutional law is a personal matter for each
judge who comes along. When only one new judge
is appointed during a short period; the unsettling
effect in constitutional law may not be great. But
when a majority of a Court is ~
suddenly reconstituted, there is likely to be a
substantial unsettlement. There will be unsettlement until the new judges have taken their positions
on constitutional doctrine. During that time -which
may extend a decade or more -constitutional law
will be in a flux. This is the necessary consequence
of our system and to my mind a healthy one. "
The Record of the Association, Vol. 4 (1949),
pp. 152-179.
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No. 72-75 GEORGIA v. UNITED STATES

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with
MR. JUSTICE \\H ITE that the Attorney General did not comply
with§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § l973c, and that
therefore Georgia's reapportionment act should have been
allowed to go into effect. It is indeed a serious intrusion,
incompatible with the basic structure of our system, for federal
authorities to compel a State to submit its legislation for advance
review. *

As a minimum, assuming the constitutionality of the

Act, the Attorney General should be required to comply with it
explicitly and to invoke its provisions only when he is able to
make an affirmative finding rather than an ambivalent one.

GEORGIA v. UNITED STATES
Footnote

*

As Mr. Justice Black stated, the power vested in federal

officials under

§

5 of the Act to veto state laws in advance of their

effectiveness "distorts our constitutional structure of government."
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.s. 301, 358 (1966) (dissenting
opinion). A similar appraisal was made by Mr. Justice Harlan,
who characterized

§

5, as construed by the Court, as "a revolu-

tionary innovation in American government." Allen v. Board of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 585 (1969) (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I have no doubt as to the power of the Congress
under the Fifteenth Amendment to enact appropriate legislation to
assure that the rights of citizens to vote shall not be denied, abridged
or infringed in any way "on account of race, colo:x; or previous condition of servitude." Indeed, in my view there is more than a power
to enact such legislation, there is a duty. My disagreement is with
the unprecedented requirement of advance review of state or local
legislative acts by federal authorities, rendered the more noxious by
its selective application in only a few states.
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MR. JusTICE WHITE, dissenting.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provides
that a State may not put into effect any chango in voting
qualifications or voting standards, practices or procedures
until it either procures a declaratory judgment from
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to the effect that the alteration does not have the
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color or submits the alteration to the Attorney General and an objection has not been interposed by that official during
the ensuing 60 days. In this case, the Attorney General
interposed an objection on March 24, 1972, to the March
9 reapportionment plan of the Georgia House of Representatives and shortly thereafter sued to enjoin the
use of that plan on the ground that the State had obtained neither the approval of the Attorney General nor
that of the District Court. The District Court held § 5
was applicable to changes in state apportionment plans
and that the section prevented the March 9 reapportionment from going into effect.
I agree that in the light of our prior cases and congressional reenactment of § 5, that section must be held
to reach state reapportionment statutes. Contrary to
the Court, however, it is my view that the Attorney General did not interpose an objection contemplated by § 5
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and that there was therefore no barrier to the March !)
reapportionment going into effect.
It is arguable from the sparse language of the Act,
which merely says that the State's modification will go
into effect unless the Attorney General enters an objection, that any objection whatsoever filed by that official
will suffice to foreclose effectiveness of the new legislation
and force the State into the District Court with the burden
of proving that its law is not unconstitutional. I can-·
not believe, however, that Congress intended to visit upon
the States the consequences of such uncontrolled discretion in the Attorney General. Surely, objections by the
Attorney General would not be valid if that officer considered himself too busy to give attention to § 5 submissions and simply decided to object to all of them, to·
one out of 10 of them or to those filed by States with
governors of a different political persuasion. Neither, I
think, did Congress anticipate that the Attorney General
could discharge his statutory duty by simply sta.ting that
he had not been persuaded that a proposed change
in election procedures would not have the forbidden
discriminatory effect. It is far more realistic and reasonable to assume that Congress expected the Attorney General to give his careful and good faith to § 5 submissions
and within 60 days after receiving all information he·
deems necessary, to make up his mind as to whether the
proposed change did or did not have a discriminatory
purpose or effect and if it did, to object thereto.
Although the constitutionality of § 5 has long since·
been upheld, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S.
301 ( 1966), it remains a serious matter that a sovereign
State must submit its legislation to federal authorities
before it may take effect. It is even more serious to insist that it initiate litigation and carry the burden of
proof as to constitutionality simply because the State
has employed a particular test or device and a sufficiently
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low percentage of its citizens ha,s voted in its elections.
And why should the State be forced to shoulder that
burden where its proposed change is so colorlc~s that the
country's highest legal officer professes his inability to
ma,ke up his mind as to its legality? If he is to object,
must he not himself conclude that the proposed change
w.ill ha,ve the forbidden purpose or effect? Given such a
proper objcetion, the matter would take on a, fmniliar adversary cast; and there would then appear to be solid
basis-at least the probable cause that a federal charge
usua,lly imports-for insisting on juclicia,l clearance.
Moreover, the issues bet,Yeen the State and the United
Sta,tes, as well as the litigative burden the State would
have to bear, could be known and examined a,nd intelligent decision made as to whether to institute suit in the
District Court. As it is, the State may be left more or
less at sea; for the Attorney General need merely announce that he is not at all convinced that the law
submitted to him is not discriminatory.
My idea as to the obligation of the Department of
Justice with respect to a submission under ~ 5 is similar
to what Congress itself has provided in § 4. Under that
provision, a State otherwise covered by the Act can
terminate coverage as to it by securing a declaratory
judgment that no discriminatory test or device has been
used during the past 10 years. In that litigation, the
section goes on to provide, the Attorney General must
consent to the entry of such a judgment if "he has no
reason to believe" that a discriminatory test or device
has been used during the 10 years preceding the filing of
the action. Thus, in even the far more important context of determining whether a State is in any respect
covered by the Act, the Attorney General, if he is to
object to a decree favorable to the State, must have reason to believe, and so state, that tests or devices with
the prohibited effect have been employed in the past.

.
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Surely, where the issue is not termination, vel non, but
the purpose ancl effect of a single statute, regulation or
other modification of voting procedures, it is not untoward to insist that the Attorney General not object
to the implementation of the change until and unless he
has reason to believe that the amendment has the prohibited purpol'e or effect. He ehould not be able to
object by simply saying that he cannot make up his mind
or that the evidence is in equipoise.

LFP,Jr.:psf 4/19/73

Rider A, p. 4 Ga. v.

u.s.

As Mr. Justice Black stated, the power vested in federal
officials to veto state laws in advance of their effectiveness
"distorts our constitutional structure of government." Allen,
supra, at 358. Moreover, the Act is unprecedented in the sense
that it imposes on a few selected states, deemed to be the worst
offenders, limitations and prior restraints not made applicable to
other states.
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Rider
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Ga. v.

u.s.

2. In Allen, supra, at 595, Mr. Justice Black addressed
the punitive nature of a federal statute which singles out a few
states in a manner which he described as r'reminiscent of old
reconstruction days," going on to say that: "I had thought that
the whole nation had long since repented of the application of
this 'conquered province' concept."
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with
MR. JUSTICE v:.H ITE that the Attorney General did not comply
with

§

5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.

§

1973c, and that

therefore Georgia's reapportionment act should have been
allowed to go into effect. It is indeed a serious intrusion,
incompatible with the basic structure of our system, for federal
authorities to compel a State to submit its legislation for advance
retiew.

•

As a minimum, assuming the constitutionality of the

Act, the Attorney General should be required to comply with it
explicitly and to invoke its provisions only when he is able to
make an affirmative finding rather than an ambivalent one.
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* As Mr. Justice Black stated, the power vested in federal

officials under

§

5 of the Act to veto state laws in advance of their

effectiveness "distorts our constitutional structure of government."
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.s. 301, 358 (1966) (dissenting
opinion). A similar appraisal was made by Mr. Justice Harlan
who characterized

§

5, as construed by the Court, as "a revolu-

tionary innovation in American government." Allen v. Board of
Elections , 393 U.s. 544, 585 (1969) (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I have no doubt as to the power of the Congress
under the Fifteenth Amendment to enact appropriate legislation to
assure that the rights of citizens to vote shall not be denied, abridged
or infringed in any way "on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude." Indeed, in my view there is more than a power
to enact such legislation, there is a duty. My disagreement is with
the unprecedented requirement of advance review of state or local
\

I

I

legislative acts by federal authorities, rendered the more noxious by
its selective application in only a few states.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with

MR. JusTICE WHITE that the Attorney General did not
comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973c, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment
act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is
indeed a serious intrusion , incompatible with the basic
structure of our system, for federal authorities to compel
a State to submit its legislation for advance rcview_;f
-:(·As Mr. Jnsi irr Bln.rk statrd, thr ]1owcr vesird in frdrral officials
under § 5 of thr Art to wto ~tate laws in ad\·ance of their effec·tiveness "distorts our ron~tituiional ~trurture of goYernmenL" South
Carolina v. Katz enbach, 3S3 U.S. :301, 358 (1966) (di;;srnting opinion). A similar nppraiHal was mnde by Mr . Justice IIarLm , who
characterized § 5, as ronHirurd b~· the Court, a~ "a rrvolntionary
innovation in Americnn gO\·ernment." Allen v. Board of Elections,
393 U. S. 544, 585 (1969) (concurring in part and dissenting 1n
part). I have no doubt as to the power of the Congre~~ unclrr ibe
Fifteenth Amendment to enact appropria1 e legi ~lation i o nssure that
the rights of citizens to vote shall not be denied, abridged or infringed in any way "on nccount of rare, color, or previous ronditi011
of servitude." Indeed, in m~' Yiew there is morr thnn a power to
enact such legi~laiion, tlwrr is n duty. 1\Iy cli~agree me nt is with tbe
unprecedented rrqu irement of ad va nce rr view of state or local lrgislative acts by federal authorities, rrnderrd the more noxious hy its'
selective application in only a few States.
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As a minimum, assuming the constitutionality of the Act,
the Attorney General should be required to comply with
it explicitly and to invoke its provisions only when he is
able to make an affirmative finding rather than an
ambivalent one.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with
MR. JusTICE WnrTE that the Attorney General did not
comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973c, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment
act should hnve been allowed to go into effect. It is
indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible with the basic
structure of our system, for federal authorities to compel
a State to submit its legislation for advance review:x..
·X·As Mr . .Just irr Black st~trcl, th e powrr \r~trcl in frdrrnl r· ffi r ial::;
under§ 5 of thr Art to \'0to ~ tatr law~ in ad·:all('r of thrir pffrcti,·encss " cli::;tort s om ron~t itut ionnl ~t rurturr of govrrnmrn t." South
Carolina v. Katzen barh, :ls3 U. F-l. 801, 8.58 (1966) (cli~srnting opinion). A similar ~pprai~al wa~ made b~· Mr . .Ju ~t i rr Harl:in , who
charartrrizrd § 5, a;; con~t nH'd by t hr Court. aH "a revolut ion :uy
innovation in Amrriran grn·rl'Jllllrnt." Allen \'. Board of Elections,
393 U. S. 544, 58.5 (1969) (comurring in part a nd di~sr nting in
parL). I ha\'0 no doubt a~ to t hr powrr of t hr Congrr~~ undrr the
Fifteenth Amrnclmcnt to rnnct :l]lpropri:ltr lrgi~lntion to nssurr that
the rights of citizrllH to votr :-;hall not br drnircl , nbridgrcl or infringed in any way "o n arronnt of rnrr , color, or prrviou ~ condition
of servitude." Indred , in m~· 'iew thcrr iR morr thnn a powrr to
enact ,;uch lrgi ~l ation, there i~ a duty. :\f~· clis:1grrrment i ~ with the
unprecedentrcl requirrmrnt of aclnmcp rr,·ipw of :-;tate or lrwnl kgi~la
tivc act::; by fcdrral anthorit ies, rrnclerrd thr more noxiou,; by its
selective application in only a few Slates.
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MR. J usTICE Po\·VELL, dissenting.
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with

MR. JusTICE WHITE that the Attorney General did not
comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973c, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment
act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is
indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible with the basic
structure of our system, for federal authorities to compel
a State to submit its legislation for advance review.*
-x·As Mr . .Justice Black ;;tated, thr power YCHted in federal dfirial~
under§ 5 of the Act to wto ~tate law~ in advame of their PiTrcti,·ene~s "d i~tort~ our con:stitntional ~true! ure of govrrnment." South
Carolina v. Katzrnbach, :3R3 U. R. 30J, 35R (10G6) (di~srnting opinion). A similar apprnisal was made U)' Mr. Justiee Ilrlrlnn , who
characterized § 5, as con~t rued by the Court, as "a rrYolutionary
innovation in Amrriran gowmmrnt .'' Allen ,._ Board of Elrctions,
393 U. S. 544, 585 (1969) (comnrring in part and dissenting in
part). I have no doubt a~ to thr powrr of the Congress undrr t hr
Fifteenth Amendmrnt to ennrt nppropri~1te legi~lation to as~mr that
the right~ of citizens to \'Ole shall not br denied. :~bridged or infringed in any way "on account of rare, color, or prrvion~ cnndition
of servitude." Indeed, ii1 my view there i~ more than n power to
enact such l egi~htion, there is a dut~-- My di~ngrc•emrnt i~ with the
unprecedented requirement of ad,·,mce revie-w of Htntc or local legi~la
tivc actH by federal a uthorit ic;;, rendered the more noxious by Its
selective application in only a few Slates.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with
MR. JusTICE WHITE that the Attorney General did not
comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973c, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment
act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is
indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible with the basic
structure of our system, for federal authorities to compel
a State to submit its legislation for advance review.'*
-X·As Mr . .TuHtire Blark ~tatE'd, the power W'~ted in frden1l - meial s
undPr § 5 of the Act to YCto Htate lawH in ad1·anre of thrir rffretii'CTIE'SS "di~to rts our constitutional >-<truc·turr of gm·prnmrnt." South
Carolina v. Kat zenbach, :~i\3 U. 8. 301. :{fiR (196()) (clis;:rnting opinion). A similar apprnisal waR madr bY l\Tr . .TustiC'r Harlan , who
charactrrizrcl § 5, a~ construrd by thr Court, n;; "n rcYolution :1 1')'
innovation in AmrriC'an grll'crnnlE'nt ." Allen "· Board of Elections,
393 U. S. 5--1-4, 51\5 (FJ69) (coll<'lll'rinp; in p:u·l and di~~rnl ing in
part.). I haYe no doubt a~ to the JH>wrr of the Congrr..:~ unclrr 1hc
Fifternth Amcnclmrnt to rnact approprintr lep;i ~Ldi on to a~~urr that
the right~ of citizrn~ to votp shall not br drnird, :dJriclp;rcl or infringed in any way "on arcouni of racr, color, or ])l'C'Yiom condition
of sen ·itudr." Indrrcl, in m~- virw t hrrc i~ morr than a powrr io
enact such legi ~btion , lbNr is a clut~-. :\f)- cli ~.tg r<'r t>'r n1 is with the
unprerrclcntccl rrquirrmcnt of advanrr reYirw of state or lneallrgi~la
tive act~ by fcder:tl nuthorilic~, rcnclNrd the morr noxious by its
selective application in only a few States.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
For the reasons statC'd in his opinion, I agree with

MR. JusTICE WHITE that the Attorney General did not
comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973c, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment
act should have been allowed to go into effect. It ig
indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible with the basic
structure of our system, for federal authorities to compel
a State to submit its legislation for advance review:x;
·::·A;; l\Ir. .Justirr Black statrd , the power ve~trd in frdrral r>ffieials
undrr § 5 of thr Art to vrto ~(:\(('law~ in ndYanrr or thrir dTretivenr~s "di~tort~ our ron~titutional ~trueturr of go1·rrnmrnt." South
Carolina v. Katzcnbach, :~s::l U.S. :301, ~5S (19G6) (di~~(·nting opinion). A similar apprn i ~al wa~ mac!r b~· Mr . .Ju~lirr Ifnrlan, who
charactrrizrd § 5, n;; ron~trurd by ihr Com!, as "a revolutionary
innovation in Amrrirnn gon•rnmrnt ." Allen v. B oard of E1Pctions,
393 U. S. 5-t4, 585 ( 1969) (concurring in part and di ~Hr nting in
part) . I have no doubt a~ to the power of the Congrr~R undrr the
Fiftrrnth Amendment to rnact appropriate lrgi:;lntion to a~~urr that
the right;; of citizen:> to vote ~hall not br den ird, abridgrd or infringed in any wny "on account of race , color, or pn•,·ious condition
of servitude." Indeed, in my 1·iew there is more than a power i o
enact ;;uch legi~l at ion, there is n dut~·. ~fy disngrerment is with the
unprecedented requ irement of ad1·ance re1·irw of sta te or loral legi;;]ativc act;; by federal authorities, rendered the more noxious by it~
selective application in only a few States.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with
MR. JusTICI~ Wrrrm that the Attorney General did not
comply with ~ 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973c, ancl that therefore Georgia's reapportionment
act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is
indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible with the basic
structure of our system, for federal authorities to compel
a State to submit its legislation for advance review.'"
·X·As Mr . .Justicr Black sLllrd, thr powrr Yr~trd in frclrral offic ials
und rr § 5 of thC' Act to 1·rto ~talC' law,; in ad1·nncC' of thl'ir C'ffC'ctin•nr~H "distorts om con~t ituti o nnl ~tr u('turr of go,TrnmC'nt." South
Carolina\". Katzenbarh. :3<:;;3 U.S. 801, 851' (19Go) (diK~C'nting opinion). A simibr upprni~al was mndr b1· l\Jr . .TuHticC' IIarlnn, who
charactrrizrcl § 5, as const niC'd by t hP Court, as "n rr1 olut ionnr~·
innovation in Amrric:lll gow•rnmrnt '' Allen 1'. Board of Elrctions,
393 U. S. 5-14, 5RI) (1969) (concurring in part and di-;~C'ntiug in
part). I haw no doubt as to tllC' pmvC'r of the Congrr~~ 1mciC'r ihC'
Fiftemih Amrnclml'nt to rnal't appror1r i;1tr l rg i ~hti0n to assmr that
the rights of citizpn;; to I'OlC' ~<hall not bl' drniPd, abridgNl or infringed in any way "on ~H·rount of rarr, color, or prl'vious condition
of servitudC'." IndPC'cl, in m~· YiPw tllC'rr i" morC' than a powC'r to
enact such ll'gisbtion, thC'rC' is a dut~·. l\T~· clisag;n•rml'ni is with the
unpreccckntccl rrquirl'mrnt of adnmcC' n•vi<•w of slatP or lornllcgi~la
tivc act~:> by fccl('J'a] authoritic::;, rcncl('l'rcl till' more noxious by its
selecliYe application in only a few States.
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MR. JusTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JusTICE PowELL
and MR. JusTICE REHNQUIS'l' join, dissenting.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provides
that a State may not put into effect any change in voting
qualifications or voting standards, practices or procedures
until it either procures a declaratory judgment from
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to the effect that the alteration does not have the
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color or submits the alteration to the Attorney General and an objection has not been interposed by that official during
the ensuing 60 days. In this case, the Attorney General
interposed an objection on March 24, 1972, to the March
9 reapportionment plan of the Georgia House of Representatives and shortly thereafter sued to enjoin the
use of that plan on the ground that the State had obtained neither the approval of the Attorney General nor
that of the District Court. The District Court held § 5
was applicable to changes in state apportionment plans
and that the section prevented the March 9 reapportionment from going into effect.
I agree that in the light of our prior cases and congressional reenactment of § 5, that section must be held
to reach state reapportionment statutes. Contrary to
the Court, however, it is my view that the Attorney Gen-
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eral did not interpose an objection contemplated by § 5
and that there was therefore no barrier to the March 9
reapportionment going into effect.
It is arguable from the sparse language of the Act,
which merely says that the State's modification will go
into effect unless the Attorney General enters an objection, that any objection whatsoever filed by that official
will suffice to foreclose effectiveness of the new legislation
and force the State into the District Court with the burden
of proving that its law is not unconstitutional. I can~
not believe, however, that Congress intended to visit upon
the States the consequences of such uncontrolled discretion in the Attorney General. Surely, objections by the
Attorney General would not be valid if that officer con~
sidered himself too busy to give attention to § 5 submissions and simply decided to object to all of them, to
one out of 10 of them or to those filed by States with
governors of a different political persuasion. Neither, I
think, did Congress anticipate that the Attorney General
could discharge his statutory duty by simply stating that
he had not been persuaded that a proposed change
in election procedures would not have the forbidden
discriminatory effect. It is far more realistic and reasonable to assume that Congress expected the Attorney General to give his careful and good fait:;,\to § 5 submissions
and within 60 days after receiving all information he
deems necessary, to make up his mind as to whether the
proposed change did or did not have a discriminatory
purpose or effect and if it did, to object thereto.
Although the constitutionality of § 5 has long since
been upheld, South Carolina v . .Katzenbach, 383 U. S.
301 (1966), it remains a serious matter that a sovereign
State must submit its legislation to federal authorities
before it may take effect. It is even more serious to insist that it initiate litigation and carry the burden of
proof as to constitutionality simply because the State
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has employed a particular test or device and a sufficiently
low percentage of its citizens has voted in its elections.
And why should the State be forced to shoulder that
burden where its proposed change is so colorless that the
country's highest legal officer professes his inability to
make up his mind as to its legality? If he is to object,
must he not himself conclude that the proposed change
will have the forbidden purpose or effect? Given such a
proper objection, the matter would take on a familiar adversary cast; and there would then appear to be solid
basis-at least the probable cause that a federal charge
usually imports-for insisting on judicial clearance.
Moreover, the issues between the State and the United
States, as well as the litigative burden the State would
have to bear, could be known and examined and intelligent decision made as to whether to institute suit in the
District Court. As it is, the State may be left more ot·
less at sea; for the Attorney General need merely announce that he is not at all convinced that the law
submitted to him is not discriminatory.
My idea as to the obligation of the Department of
Justice with respect to a submission under § 5 is similar
to what Congress itself has provided in § 4. Under that
provision, a State otherwise covered by the Act can
terminate coverage as to it by securing a declaratory
judgment that no discriminatory test or device has been
used during the past 10 years. In that litigation, the
section goes on to provide, the Attorney General must
consent to the entry of such a judgment if "he has no
reason to believe" that a discriminatory test or device
has been used during the 10 years preceding the filing of
the action. Thus, i11 even the far more important COlitext of determining whether a 8tate 1s in any respect.
covered by the Act, the Attorney General, if he is to
object to a decree favorable to the State, must have reason to believe, ancl so state, that tests or devices with
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the prohibited effect have been employed in the past.
Surely, where the issue is not termination, vel non, but
the purpose and effect of a single statute, regulation or
other modification of voting procedures, it is not untoward to insist that the Attorney General not object
to the implementation of the change until and unless hP
has reason to believe that the amendment has the prohibited purpose or effect. He should not be able to
object by simply saying that he cannot make up his mind
or that the evidence is in equipoise.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with
MR. J u sTICE WHITg that the Attorney General did not
comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973c, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment
act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is
indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible with the basic
structure of our system. for federal authorities to compel
a State to submit its legislation for advance review:x·
->:·As Mr. .Ju:;tice Black ~ tatrd, thr powrr vr~trd in frdrral officials
under§ 5 of the Act to Hto st:1te law~ in aclvancp of thrir rffrctiveness "cli:;torts our conHtitutional H(ructure of govrrnment." South
Carolina v. Katzrnbach, 8R8 U.S. 801 , :35R (19GG) (clissrnti ng opinion). A ~imi l ar appraiHal was made b~- Mr . .Ju:;tice Harlan, who
characterized § 5, ns constrned by the Court, as "a rrvolutionary
innovation in American government." Allen v. Board of Elections,
393 U. S. 544, 585 (1969) (concurring in part and cli~~enting in
part). I havr no doubt aH to the ]HJwrr of the Congre~:-: under the
Fifteenth Amendment to enact ap]lropriatr lrgi~lation to n~:-;urr that
the right~ of citizens to Yote ,;hall not be drnied, nbridged or infringrd in any way " on account of race, color, or previouH cone! it ion
of servitude." Indeed, in my view there i:< more than n power to
enact Huch legi:<lation , there iHa duty. ;\T~ - di.~ngreement is with the
unprecedented requirement of advanre review of state or locnllegi:<lativc acts by fcdrrnl authorit ies, rendered the more noxious by its
selecLive application in only a few States.
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As a minimum, assuming the constitutionality of the Act,
the Attorney General should be required to comply with
it explicitly and to invoke its provisions only when he is
able to make an affirmative finding rather than an
ambivalent one.
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CHIEF JUSTICE BuRGER, concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the Court but I do
so under the mandate of Allen v. Stal e Board of Elections,
393 U. S. 544 (1~9). I have previously expressed my
.reservations as to the correctness of that holding. See
Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 397 (1971) (BLACK;J'v.IUN, J., concurring).
.MR.
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MIL JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
For the reasons stated in his opinion , I agree with
MR. Jus'l.'ICE WHITE that the Attorney General did not
comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973c, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment
act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is
indeed a serious intrusion , incompatible with the basic
structure of our system. for federal authorities to compel
a State to submit its legislation for advance review::.:·As Mr . .JnRtice Black stated, the power vested in federal official~
1mdcr § 5 of the Act to veto f'tatc law· in mh·ance of their effectivell<'~S " di ~tort:; our con~titutionnl structure of government." South
Carolina,._ Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 358 (1966) (cli~scnting opinion). A o:imibr appraif'al was made b~· Mr. Just ice II:trbn, who
characterized § 5, as constrned by the Comt, as "a re,·olution:u~
innoYation in Americnn govemment." Allen v. Board of Elrctions,
393 U. S. 544, 585 (1969) (concurring in part and di~:;e ntin!!: in
part). I h:n-e no doubt as to the power of the Congre~s under the
Fifteenth Amendment to enact appropriate legislation to n~snre that
ihe rights of citizens to vote shall not he denied , a bridged or illfringed in an!' way "on a,ccount of race, color, or previous condition
of sen ·itudc." Indeed, in my view there i:; more than n power to
enact such lcgi;;lution, there iR a duty. My di~agreement is with the
nnprecedcnted requirement of acl,·ance review of state or locallegi...:latil·e acts by federal anthoritics, rendered the more noxious by its
sclecti\·e application in only a few States.
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MR. Jus·rrcE PowELL, dissenting.
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with
MH. JusTICE WHITE that the Attorney General did not
comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
~ 1973c, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment
act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is
indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible with the basic
structure of our system. for federal authorities to compel
a State to submit its legislation for advance review.~~
->:·As l\Ir. Justice Black sta ted, the power vested in federal offici:tls
1mdrr § 5 of the Act to veto ~tate Jaws in a<.lnmce of their effectiwJie~s "di~torts our con;; I ilutional st rurture of government." Soul h
Carolina Y. Katzenbach, 388 U. S. 301, 358 (1966) (di~senting opinion). A similar apprai~al was made by Mr. Justice Harlan, who
chnractcrized § 5, as construed by the Court, as "a rm·olutionnry
innovntion in American p;on:rnment." Allen v. Board of Elections,
393 U. S. 544, 5R5 (1969) (concurring in part and di~::;entinp; in
part). I haw no doubt as to the power of I he Congress under the
Fifteenth Amendment to enact appropriat<' lrp;i~latiou to nssme that
the rights of citizens to vote shall not be denied, abridg<'d or infringed in an:-.· way "on account of race, color, or previous condition
of srn ·itude." Indeed, in my view there is more than a 11ower to
<'mct such legi~lation, there is a duly. l\'Iy clisagr<'ement i~ with the
unprecedented requirement of adnmce revirw of state or locnllegi.,;lative acts by federal authorities, rendered the morr noxiou ~ hy it s
selective application in only a few States.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with
MR. JusTICE WHITE that the Attorney General did not
comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
~ 1973c, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment
act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is
indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible with the basic
structure of our system, for federal authorities to compel
a State to submit its legislation for advance review.*
':·As l\1r. Ju;:;ticr Black stated , thr power wstrd in frdrrnl officials
\mdrr § 5 of thr Act to veto st::tle laws in advame of thrir rffectiYrlll'iiS " di stort~ our constitutional structure of g;ovrrnmrnt." South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 358 (1966) (di~~rnting opinion). A fiimibr :1pprai~al was made b~r Mr. Justice Harlan , who
rharactrrizrd § 5, as conAtrurd by the Court, as "a rrYolutionar~·
inno1·ation in American goYernment." Allen , .. Board of Elections,
393 U. S. 544, 5,'5 (1969) (concurring in parl and cli,::;rnling in
11art). I ha1·e no doubt as to the power of the Congrc~s under tlw
Fiflrenth Amendment to enact appropriatr legislation to a~sure that
thr rights of citizens to vote shall not be denird, abridged or infringrd in any way "on account of race, color, or previous condition
of sen ·itude." Indeed, in my view there is more than a power to
enact such legislat ion, therr is a duly. l\Iy cli ~agree ment i ~ with the
lmprecedented requirement of ad1·ance reYiew of state or locallegi ~la
til·e acts by federal authorities, renderrd the more noxious by its
sclectiYe application in only a few States.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with
MR. Jus·ncE WHI'l.'E that the Attorney General did not
comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973c, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment
act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is
indeed a serious intrusion, incompatible with the basic
structure of our system, for federal authorities to compel
a State to submit its legislation for advance review. i:·
;:·As Mr. Ju,;t ire Black stated, tbe power Yested in frdernl officials
under§ 5 of the Act to Yeto state bws in a(h·anre of tlwir efferti,·eness "distorts our con~lilu tiona! st rurtmr of p;ovrrnment." South
Carolina "· Katzenbach, 3il3 U. S. 301, 358 (1966) (dis~ent ing opinion). A similar apprai~al was made by Mr. Ju~tire Harlan, who
characterized § 5. as construed by the Court, as "a re,·olutionar~·
innoYntion in American government." Allen v. Board of Elections,
393 U. S. 544, 58.5 (1969) (concmring in purl and dissenting in
part). I ha1·e no doubt as to the power of the Congre~R unclE'!' the
Fifteenth Amendment to enact appropriate lcp;islation to assure tktl
thr rights of citizens to vote shall not be dcnird, abridged or infringrd in any way "on account of race, color, or previous condition
of scn·ilude." Indeed, in my Yiew there is more than a p01wr to
enact such legislation, there ir< a duty. l\Iy diRagrrement is with the
unprecedentrd requiremrnl of adYance review of state or local legi~la
tive acts by federal anthorities, renderrd the morr noxious by it.;
selecli,·e application in only a few Stales.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
For the reasons stated in his opinion , I agree with
Mn. JusTICE WHITE that the Attorney General did not
comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§ 1973c, and that therefore Georgia's reapportionment
act should have been allowed to go into effect. It is
indeed a serious intrusion , incompatible with tho basic
structure of our system , for federal authorities to compel
a State to submit its legislation for advance rcview.i:·
-x·A::; Mr. Justi ce Bla ck stated, the power yested in federal official;;
under § 5 of th o Act to veto state law,.; in aclnmrc of their efTectin' nr::;~ "distorts our con ~ titutional Rtructure of government ." South
Carolina Y. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 358 (1966) (dissenting opinion). A similar appmi~al was made b~· Mr .•Justice Harlan , who
ch:uactcrized § 5, as construed b~r tho Court , as "a re,·olntionar.v
innovation in American government." A/len v. Board of Election s,
393 U. S. 544, 585 (1969) (concurring in part and di ~sentin~ in
part). I lw. ve no doubt as to tho power of tho Congre~R under the
Fifteen( h Amendment to enact ap]1ropriato legi ~lat ion to nRsuro that
the rights of citizens to vote shall not be denied, abridged or infrin ged in an:v way " on account of rare, color, or previous condition
of servitude." Indeed, in my Yiow there is more than a power to
enact such legislation, there is a duty. My clisngreomcnt is \Yith tho
unprecedented requiremrnt of aclnmce review of state or loc a llegi~la
t iYe a rts by fcder;tl authorit ics, rendered 1he more noxious by its
selective application in only a few States.
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As a minimum, assuming the constitutionality of the Act,
the Attorney General should be required to comply with
it explicitly and to invoke its provisions only when he is
able to make an affirmative finding rather than an
ambivalent one.
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